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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article will focus on how a simple procedural statute enacted
to require enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal court has
become unrecognizable as the law Congress adopted in 1925. Today,
as a result of judicial construction, the Federal Arbitration Act1
(FAA) reaches much further and imposes itself on a far greater proportion of our citizens than was ever envisioned in 1925. The FAA as
interpreted affects statutory rights, consumer rights, and employee
rights, as well as state police powers to protect those rights.2 Today’s
statute—which has been construed to preempt state law,3 eliminate
the requirement of consent to arbitration,4 permit arbitration of
* Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments and suggestions of Professors Cynthia Ho, Michael
Kaufman, and Michael Zimmer and faculty who heard earlier versions of this article and
gave insightful comments in workshops at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Michigan State
University College of Law, and Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Research assistance was ably provided by Mark Jane.
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).
2. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction,
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 401 (“Under the [arbitration] law written by the Court, birds of prey
will sup on workers, consumers, shippers, passengers, and franchisees; the protective police
power of the federal government and especially of the state governments is weakened . . . .”);
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an Age of Compulsory Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 37 (“[D]isplacing
adjudication through pre-dispute arbitration clauses systematically reduces the legal liability of corporate defendants.”).
3. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 9-17 (1984).
4. Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts as generally enforceable); Washington
Mut. Fin. Group v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 264-66 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that an arbitration
agreement was enforceable against illiterate consumers, even though they had no knowledge of the arbitration requirement); Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 327 F. Supp. 2d
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statutory rights,5 and remove the jury trial right from citizens without their knowledge or consent6—is a statute that would not likely
have commanded a single vote in the 1925 Congress.7
What processes and methods have enabled the judiciary to create
a law never enacted by Congress? This Article will examine the interpretive methods the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court,
has used in major cases that have defined the FAA, as well as the effect of the choices it has made. Part II will examine the context of the
FAA, including the drafting and political history, to see how its proponents and members of Congress understood the Act, which was
adopted virtually without opposition. Part III will explore how Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins8 and Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.
York9 produced a dilemma that caused the first major misstep in interpreting the FAA. This misstep occurred in Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,10 when the Supreme Court incorrectly asserted that the 1925 Congress relied exclusively upon the
Commerce Clause as the underlying power for enacting the FAA.
Part IV will examine how that misstep led to even greater missteps
in two subsequent cases, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.11 and Southland Corp. v. Keating.12 In those
cases, the Supreme Court recast a procedural statute that was applicable only in federal court into a substantive statute applicable in
both state and federal courts. Part V will follow the increasing expansion of the statute, which the Court interpreted not only to cover
statutory claims, an area never anticipated by the enacting Congress,
but also to cover worker agreements, which had been expressly excluded by Congress in 1925.13 Finally, the major misconstructions
which took place in Prima Paint and Southland have recently been
reconfirmed by the Court in its February 2006 decision, Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna.14 Moreover, the Buckeye Court expanded the holding in Prima Paint by finding that an arbitrator

678, 683 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (upholding arbitration agreement even though blind consumer
had no knowledge of agreement).
5. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985).
6. See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 729-30 (2001).
7. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 2, at 402 (“[I]f the FAA had been presented
to Congress, as legislation having the effects ascribed to them by the Court . . . [it would
not] have been assured of a single vote of approval.”).
8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
10. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
11. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
12. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
13. See infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
14. 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006).
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rather than a court should decide a claim that a contract is void
for illegality.15
The Article concludes that the different interpretive methods the
Court used to construct the current statute failed to cabin judicial
discretion to legislate and resulted in a complete rewriting of the
statute. The statute’s new architecture has had a substantial impact
on our legal system. The FAA created by the Supreme Court in the
last twenty-five years reflects judicial policy preferences reminiscent
of the policies prevailing at the beginning of the last century, including laissez-faire economics and an antipathy to state laws and regulations favoring individuals, consumers, and small businesses.
II. INTENDED SCOPE OF THE FAA
In the 1920s, Julius Cohen and Charles Bernheimer had a threestep plan for promoting arbitration: “The first is to get a State statute, and then to get a Federal law to cover interstate and foreign
commerce and admiralty, and, third, to get a treaty with foreign
countries.”16 The two men had already successfully combined forces
in New York, where in 1920, Cohen, a lawyer who served as general
counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce, and Bernheimer, a cotton goods merchant who chaired the Chamber’s arbitration committee, were instrumental in obtaining the first modern
state arbitration statute.17 The New York statute made all arbitration agreements enforceable, including agreements to arbitrate future disputes. Before the enactment, a party to an arbitration
agreement could at any time prior to the award simply refuse to arbitrate and courts would not enforce the agreement.18 This was true
whether the agreement was to arbitrate future disputes or to submit
an existing dispute to arbitration.19
Cohen and Bernheimer were strong believers in the efficacy of arbitration. Although justifiably proud of their success in New York,
they wanted arbitration to be enforceable beyond the state’s borders.
If a New York party agreed to arbitrate with a citizen of another
state that did not have a similar law, the arbitration agreement
would not be enforced in that other state’s courts. More importantly,

15. See id. at 1209.
16. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 646
Before the J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16 (1924) [hereinafter
Joint Hearings] (statement of Julius Cohen).
17. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 28, 34-37 (1992). Professor Macneil defines “modern” arbitration statutes as those that make agreements to arbitrate future disputes irrevocable. Id. at 15.
18. See WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS
239-40 (1930).
19. See MACNEIL, supra note 17, at 20.
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any enforcement attempt in federal court under diversity jurisdiction
would fail because the federal courts would not enforce the agreement. Federal and state courts both followed ancient rules of English
law that “performance of a written agreement to arbitrate would not
be enforced in equity, and . . . if an action at law were brought . . .
such agreement could not be pleaded in bar of the action; nor would
such an agreement be ground for a stay of proceedings until arbitration was had.”20
Cohen and Bernheimer’s next push, therefore, was twofold: to get
Congress to pass a federal law that would make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court and to get the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to put forth a Uniform Arbitration Act which could then be adopted by each state,
making arbitration agreements also enforceable in state courts. Finally, a third step would be for the United States to enter into a
treaty with other nations to enforce international arbitration agreements and awards.21
The original Federal Arbitration Act was drafted, principally by
Julius Cohen, on the model of the New York statute.22 In their campaign to convince Congress to pass legislation that would make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court, Bernheimer and
Cohen adopted different functions.23 Bernheimer organized the support of the national business organizations. Cohen spearheaded the
legal case.
At the Joint Hearings of the Senate and House Subcommittees,
Bernheimer asserted that “[t]he statement I make is backed up by 73
commercial organizations in this country who have, by formal vote,
approved of the bill before you gentlemen.”24 He stated the practical,
business case: “[A]rbitration saves time, saves trouble, saves money. .
. . It preserves business friendships. . . . It raises business standards.
It maintains business honor, prevents unnecessary litigation, and
eliminates the law’s delay by relieving our courts.”25
20. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. The Senate Report
also noted that the arbitration agreement “was subject to revocation by either of the parties at any time before the award” and that this rendered the agreements “ineffectual” because “the party aggrieved by the refusal of the other party to carry out the arbitration
agreement was without adequate remedy.” Id.
21. See Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 16.
22. See id. at 15, 40.
23. Their work began in advance of the passage of the New York statute. In 1918,
Cohen published a book, Commercial Arbitration and the Law. Under Bernheimer’s leadership, the New York Chamber of Commerce joined forces with the New York State Bar
Association to work on this issue. Cohen and Bernheimer were effective proselytizers, helping to pass an arbitration statute in New Jersey after the New York statute was adopted.
See MACNEIL, supra note 17, at 28, 31, 42-43.
24. Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 7-8.
25. Id.
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Cohen, on the other hand, sought to convince Congress of the
value of arbitration from the legal perspective. Cohen’s strategy can
be seen in the brief he submitted to Congress, which was made part
of the record of the congressional hearings.26 He explained why making arbitration agreements enforceable would provide a much-needed
remedy for existing problems in the legal system. He also sought to
persuade Congress that although courts had in the past refused to
enforce arbitration agreements, this resulted from an anachronism in
the law which Congress had the power to correct. Further, he emphasized that public policy would be well served by Congress adopting this legislation.
Cohen asserted that the statute was directed at three evils: (1) long
delays caused by congested courts and excessive motion practice, (2)
the expense of litigation, and (3) the failure through litigation to
reach a decision regarded as just.27 Businessmen needed solutions
that were simpler, faster, and cheaper. An arbitration act that would
make arbitration agreements enforceable would accomplish those
goals and provide a remedy for the three evils. Cohen made clear in
his brief that what was being proposed to accomplish these goals was
simple and limited—a statute that would apply only to procedure in
the federal courts and would not affect state law:
The statute as drawn establishes a procedure in the Federal
courts for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. . . .
. . . It is no infringement upon the right of each State to decide
for itself what contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws. To
be sure whether or not a contract exists is a question of the substantive law of the jurisdiction wherein the contract was made.
But whether or not an arbitration agreement is to be enforced is a
question of the law of procedure and is determined by the law of
the jurisdiction wherein the remedy is sought.28

Cohen emphasized that because the statute was procedural, it
would not “infringe upon the provinces or prerogatives of the
States.”29 Rather, he noted, “[t]here is no disposition . . . by means
of the Federal bludgeon to force an individual State into an unwilling submission to arbitration enforcement. The statute can
not have that effect.”30
26. Id. at 33-41.
27. See id. at 34-35.
28. Id. at 37.
29. Id. at 39.
30. Id. at 40. One of Cohen’s fellow reformers, Alexander Rose, who represented a precursor of the American Arbitration Association at the Joint Hearings—The Arbitration Society of America—echoed Cohen’s call for federal legislation:
We have a weakness in our system of arbitration. We need, and we must have
the cooperation of the Federal courts. We must have . . . the Federal statute,
because while the dispute is a domestic one, we can well dispose of it. But when

104

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:99

Cohen also emphasized that the procedures for compelling arbitration as well as for enforcing the award would be much more
straightforward than litigated motions, thereby reducing expense
and delay through formalities or legal technicalities. He noted that
“enforcement proceeds with a minimum of legal intervention and
parties are assured of . . . [a] speedy and expert hearing . . . .”31
In explaining why this particular legislation was needed, Cohen
first noted that since an arbitration agreement is essentially a business contract, it should be treated the same as other business contracts.32 Unlike other contracts, however, at the time, parties could
revoke an arbitration agreement at any point prior to the award being rendered.33 Moreover, although the revocation was considered a
breach, courts would not provide relief in the form of specific performance, nor could a party obtain a stay of court proceedings so that
an arbitration could go forward.34 Damages were technically available
but in practice were difficult if not impossible to prove.35 This situation
permitted “the dishonest party [to] escape from his obligations.”36
Cohen’s brief explained the English origins of the courts’ refusal to
enforce arbitration agreements:
For many centuries there has been established a rule, rooted
originally in the jealousy of courts for their jurisdiction, that parties might not, by their agreement, oust the jurisdiction of the

a merchant in New York sells his merchandise to some one [sic] in a foreign jurisdiction, his arbitration law is defeated. . . . In short, he needs the aid of the
Federal law . . . .
Id. at 27. Like Cohen, Rose did not conceive of the law as having any direct applicability to
the states. Rather, he believed that if Congress adopted the statute, one significant benefit
would be that States, many of which had no arbitration laws, would be inspired to adopt
similar laws:
There is one excellent result to be achieved in the enactment of this bill, apart
from the enactment itself; it will set a standard throughout the United States.
There are many States which have no arbitration law. . . . [T]he enactment of
this law, extending its effect all over the United States, will have an effect upon
the cause of that much-desired thing—uniform legislation . . . . I have no doubt
all of the States would pattern after it.
Id. at 28.
31. Id. at 40. Rose made the case for simplicity more dramatically:
[T]he crying demand and the need of the hour is what? It is to simplify legal
matters . . . .
....
. . . [Y]ou can have here a system of arbitration which is one that the people
want; the public want it. They want speedy justice, and they want plain justice,
in as simple terms as it can be reduced to.
Id. at 26-27.
32. See id. at 38-39.
33. MACNEIL, supra note 17, at 20.
34. Id.
35. See id; see also STURGES, supra note 18, at 85-86, 255-62.
36. Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 39.
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courts. This rule was so firmly established that our American
courts did not feel themselves free to change the rule . . . .37

Although courts did not feel free to make this change themselves,
once the New York legislature adopted a statute making arbitration
agreements enforceable, New York courts, according to Cohen,
whole-heartedly accepted the change.38
Cohen, Bernheimer, and their colleagues took great pains to impress upon Congress the limited scope of the proposed legislation. In
response to a concern that the legislation would apply to seamen,
W.H.H. Piatt39 explained that the statute was not intended to cover
workers.40 Although the bill did not specifically exclude all employment contracts, the constitutional jurisprudence at the time viewed
most employment contracts as involving intrastate and not interstate
commerce.41 Seamen, on the other hand, could be viewed as having
contracts that were in foreign or interstate commerce. Piatt and the
other proponents had no objection to specifically excluding seamen
and sought to make clear that other workers who might be perceived
as working in interstate commerce would also be excluded, since the
FAA was not intended to cover employment contracts at all.42 Piatt
thus suggested adding the following language: “but nothing herein
contained shall apply to seamen or any class of workers in interstate
and foreign commerce,”43 noting that “[i]t is not intended that this
shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all.”44
Emphasizing that the legislation should not apply to workers,
Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, sent a letter to Congress on this point that was incorporated in the records of both the
1923 Hearings and the 1924 Joint Hearings. Hoover characterized
the objection that had been raised as an objection “to the inclusion of
workers’ contracts in the law’s scheme.”45 He suggested clarification
by using virtually the same language as that recommended by Piatt
but with the addition of “railroad employees” to the list.46 The lan37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288 (N.Y. 1921)).
39. Piatt was testifying in his capacity as chairman of the Committee of Commerce Trade and Commercial Law of the American Bar Association.
40. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Hearings].
41. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 136 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“When the Act was passed (and the commerce power was closely confined) our case law
indicated that the only employment relationships subject to the commerce power were
those in which workers were actually engaged in interstate commerce.”).
42. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
43. 1923 Hearings, supra note 40, at 9.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 14; Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 21.
46. 1923 Hearings, supra note 40, at 14; Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 21.
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guage in the Hoover letter was nearly the exact language added to
the statute: “but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.”47
Thus, the supporters of the legislation did not believe that it
would apply to any workers at all. Under the view of the Commerce
Clause at that time, the Act did not apply to contracts of most workers.48 It only applied to contracts of workers actually engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, such as seamen or railroad employees,
and those workers were specifically excluded. Piatt explained that
the Act was “purely an act to give the merchants the right or the
privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what
their damages are, if they want to do it. Now that is all there is in
this.”49 This was the central concept behind the Act: to provide for enforceability of arbitration agreements between merchants—parties
presumed to be of approximately equal bargaining strength—who needed
a way to resolve their disputes expeditiously and inexpensively.50
The hearings make clear that the focus of the Act was merchantto-merchant arbitrations, never merchant-to-consumer arbitrations.
All of the examples given by Bernheimer as to cases he knew about
or cases he had personally been involved with through the New York
Chamber of Commerce were cases between merchants.51 At one point
in the hearings, Senator Walsh of Montana raised the question
whether the legislation would apply to contracts which were not
really voluntary—for example, where one party, such as an insurance company or a railroad company, had much more bargaining
power and was able to provide a contract on a “take it or leave it” basis.52 Piatt, who was testifying at the time, said:

47. The drafters merely switched “foreign” and “interstate” in the statute. 9 U.S.C. § 1
(2000).
48. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); see also supra note 41
and accompanying text.
49. 1923 Hearings, supra note 40, at 9.
50. As Bernheimer testified on behalf of all the business associations he represented,
The bill on the one hand aims to eliminate friction, delay, and waste, and
on the other to establish and maintain business amity . . . . If inexpensive but
dependable arbitration were possible instead of costly, time-consuming, and
troublesome litigation, the risk [of doing business] would be correspondingly
smaller and the price made to conform therewith. Not only will the suggested
law accomplish all of this, but it will help to conserve perishable and semiperishable food products, and save many millions of dollars in foodstuffs now
wasted because of the lack of legally binding arbitration facilities. . . .
....
. . . The merchants want this very badly.
Id. at 3, 7.
51. Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 5-9.
52. Id. at 9.
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I would not favor any kind of legislation that would permit the
forcing a man to sign that kindof [sic] a contract. . . .
....
. . . I think that ought to be protested against, because it is the
primary end of this contract that it is a contract between merchants one with another, buying and selling goods.53

Cohen was also asked to respond to a concern about adhesion contracts during the Joint Hearings. The Chairman, Senator Sterling,
first asked Cohen to explain the reason courts had not been willing to
enforce arbitration agreements. Cohen initially referred to the courts’
concerns about “ouster of jurisdiction,”54 but then acknowledged:
[T]he real fundamental cause was that at the time this rule was
made people were not able to take care of themselves in making
contracts, and the stronger men would take advantage of the
weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect them. And the
courts said, “If you let the people sign away their rights, the powerful people will come in and take away the rights of the weaker
ones.” And that still is true to a certain extent.55

Senator Sterling then quizzed Cohen specifically about whether
this was not also the case with respect to “take it or leave it” contracts between railroads and shippers. In response, Cohen
claimed that shippers were protected by the Bills of Lading Act
and, further, that
the Federal Government, through its regularly constituted bodies .
. . protect[s] everybody. Railroad contracts and express contracts
and insurance contracts are provided for. You can not get a provision into an insurance contract to-day unless it is approved by the
insurance department. In other words, people are protected to-day
as never before.56

Cohen and his fellow supporters thus indicated that this bill
would not apply in adhesion contracts for several reasons. First,
there were protections written into law; second, protective requirements were issued by federal agencies; and third, that was simply
not the intent of the legislation, which was specifically aimed at voluntary resolution of disputes between merchants. Arbitration was, as

Id.

The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are
entered into are really not voluntary things at all. . . . It is the same with a
good many contracts of employment. A man says, “These are our terms. All
right, take it or leave it.” Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to sign
it; and then he surrenders his right to have his case tried by the court, and has
to have it tried before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
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Alexander Rose noted, “a purely voluntary thing. [The legislation] is
only the idea that arbitration may now have the aid of the court to
enforce these provisions which men voluntarily enter into.”57 The new
law was not intended to permit a party with greater economic
strength to compel a weaker party to arbitrate. As Representative
Graham noted in the House floor debate in 1924, “[t]his bill simply
provides for one thing, and that is to give an opportunity to enforce
an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty contracts—an
agreement to arbitrate, when voluntarily placed in the document by
the parties to it.”58 Representative Graham emphasized the narrow
scope of the bill:
It does not involve any new principle of law except to provide a
simple method by which the parties may be brought before the
court in order to give enforcement to that which they have already
agreed to. . . . It creates no new legislation, grants no new rights,
except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts
and in admiralty contracts.59

Cohen’s final task was to assure Congress that it had the power
and the authority to adopt the legislation. Although this did not seem
to be seriously in doubt, there had been a state and federal constitutional challenge to the New York arbitration statute.60 That challenge had been soundly rejected by the New York Court of Appeals in
a decision by Judge Cardozo that Cohen cited extensively in his
brief.61 With respect to Congress’ authority, Cohen asserted that it
did not depend upon the commerce or admiralty power. Rather:
[Its authority] rests upon the constitutional provision by which
Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal
Courts. So far as congressional acts relate to the procedure in the
Federal courts, they are clearly within the congressional power.
This principle is so evident and so firmly established that it can
not be seriously disputed.62

57. Id. at 26.
58. 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 289-92 (N.Y. 1921).
61. Id., cited in Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 39. There had also been a constitutional question raised as to whether the New York statute could apply in an admiralty case
to compel a party to arbitrate. Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924). The
U.S. Supreme Court held that New York State was free to provide for specific performance
of contractual arbitration clauses because the statutory remedy sought did not change the
substantive admiralty law or attempt to govern the remedy in admiralty court. Id. at 124.
62. Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 37. Cohen cited to Article I, Section 8 of the
United States Constitution, which gives Congress power “to constitute Tribunals inferior to
the supreme Court,” and Article III, Section 1, which provides that “The judicial Power of
the United States shall be vested . . . in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.” Id.
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According to Cohen, since the Arbitration Act related solely to procedure in the federal courts, the question of whether there was authority under the Commerce Clause was not at issue.63
Cohen noted that the proposed law, by simply declaring the policy
of recognizing and enforcing arbitration agreements in the federal
courts, “does not encroach upon the province of the individual
States.”64 He then speculated, however, that Congress probably does
have “ample power to declare that all arbitration agreements connected with interstate commerce or admiralty transactions shall be
recognized as valid and enforceable even by the State courts.”65 Yet,
having made the argument that Congress probably had broad authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the statute, Cohen concluded that even if it were found that Congress had no such power, it
would not affect the current statute. Because the primary purpose of
the statute was to make arbitration agreements enforceable in the
federal courts, Congress “rests solely upon its power to prescribe the
jurisdiction and duties of the Federal courts.”66
It did not appear that members of the Joint Subcommittees hearing testimony on the bill were too concerned about their authority. At
one point, this brief conversation took place between Representative
Dyer and the Chairman, Senator Sterling:
Representative DYER. There is no question of the authority of Congress to legislate on this subject as provided in the bill, is there?
The CHAIRMAN. I do not think there is.
Representative DYER. The authority and jurisdiction
is ample?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.67
There was, however, no discussion among the Committee members as to what constituted the basis for that authority and jurisdiction. The sole discussion is found in Cohen’s brief, attached to the
proceedings. The Committee Report for the House, though, states:
The matter is properly the subject of Federal action. Whether an
agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of

63. Id. Cohen specifically noted that in declaring arbitration agreements to be valid,
the statute was not declaring their existence as a matter of substantive law. Id. at 38.
64. Id. at 38.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 24.
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procedure to be determined by the law court in which the proceeding is brought and not one of substantive law to be determined by
the law of the forum in which the contract is made. Before such
contracts could be enforced in the Federal courts, therefore, this
law is essential.68

The House Report suggests that Congress clearly had the power to
pass a procedural act whose purpose is to enforce contracts in federal
courts. Yet, the Report continued by noting that “[t]he remedy is
founded also upon the Federal control over interstate commerce and
over admiralty.”69 By use of the word “also,” the reference to the
commerce and admiralty power appears to be a fall-back position, a
secondary basis of power. The passage as a whole makes clear that
Committee members saw the Arbitration Act as Cohen presented it:
a statute providing for enforcement and therefore relating to remedies, which meant a procedural and not substantive statute, and
one that related only to procedures in federal court.70 Such a statute was well within Congress’ authority to establish and control
federal courts.71
Having been passed without a single negative vote in either the
House or the Senate, the Federal Arbitration Act was signed into law
in 1925 and became effective January 1, 1926.72 Cohen immediately
took steps to educate the legal public about the Act, publishing an article, The New Arbitration Law, in February 1926.73 He essentially
incorporated into the article the brief he provided to Congress, but he
changed emphasis somewhat, adapting his text to a different audience—attorneys and law professors. First, Cohen devoted more argument to the fact that the statute provides “improvement of . . . procedural remedies,” noting that changes in procedure are “sponsored
by the legal profession in the interests of the better administration of
justice” and that the new statute “is simply a new procedural remedy, particularly adapted to the settlement of commercial disputes.”74
Second, he put more emphasis on the voluntary nature of the application of the Act. “No one is required to make an agreement to arbitrate. Such action by a party is entirely voluntary. . . . [The new arbitration law] is merely a new method for enforcing a contract freely
68. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. See Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 37-40; see also David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal
Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 17 (2004) (noting that at the time of the
FAA enactment “both remedial and procedural matters were deemed to be lex fori—the
law of the court—rather than lex loci—the substantive law of the jurisdiction”).
71. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
72. See infra note 81.
73. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265 (1926).
74. Id. at 279.
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made by the parties thereto.”75 Third, and most important, Cohen,
the great proponent and activist for arbitration, made a strong argument to the legal community that arbitration has limitations and
should not be misused. Arbitration was a remedy that was wellsuited, according to Cohen,
to the disposition of the ordinary disputes between merchants as to
questions of fact—quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance
with terms of payment, excuses for non-performance, and the like.
It has a place also in the determination of the simpler questions of
law—the questions of law which arise out of these daily relations
between merchants as to the passage of title, the existence of warranties, or [related] questions of law. . . .76

On the other hand, Cohen noted that not all questions arising out
of contracts should be arbitrated. Arbitration should not, for example, be used to resolve more complex issues. Specifically, Cohen informed his fellow members of the profession that arbitration was “not
the proper method for deciding points of law of major importance involving constitutional questions or policy in the application of statutes.”77 These kinds of questions were not within the particular experience of arbitrators and thus were “better left to the determination of skilled judges with a background of legal experience and established systems of law.”78 Although Cohen had not expressly made
this argument to Congress, he and others had testified at the Hearings as to the limited nature of the bill. And Cohen’s position in the
article is consistent with his position before Congress because the
case he and others made to Congress was exactly what Cohen described in his article as the proper use of arbitration—to resolve
heavily fact-based disputes between merchants, “where all meet
upon a common ground.”79
We know from the legislative history and from contemporary writings what the reformers wanted, what they believed the Act would
accomplish, and what they told the members of Congress the legislation was intended to accomplish. The purpose of the Arbitration Act
was primarily to make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal
court80 and secondly to provide procedures that would make this enforcement process simple and expeditious, thereby enabling merchants to resolve their disputes more cheaply and easily. The FAA
was a bill of limited scope, intended to apply in disputes between
75. Id.
76. Id. at 281.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Of course, for the parties to be in federal court there had to be some basis of federal jurisdiction other than the arbitration agreement. See infra notes 210-11.
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merchants of approximately equal economic strength to questions
arising out of their daily relations. The bill was not the result of
trade-offs or strategic compromises because it was essentially unopposed.81 The FAA would only apply when arbitration was voluntarily
agreed to by the parties. According to Cohen, its leading proponent
and principal drafter, the legislation was to apply to disputes involving facts and simple questions of law, not statutory or constitutional
issues, since arbitration was simply not a proper method for deciding
points of law of major importance. The legislation would not apply to
workers or labor disputes. Because the statute dealt with enforcement and therefore simply ensured a remedy, it was a procedural
statute and only applied in federal courts. It would not affect state
law or state courts in any way. It was this limited statute that the
Congress of 1925 believed it was enacting. We will see, however, that
our courts have turned this legislation into something else entirely.
Today, the statute which was enacted as a procedural statute effective only in federal court has been interpreted to apply to states82
and to preempt state law that conflicts with the Court’s interpretation of the FAA.83 A state statute which attempts to protect citizens
by regulation of the use of arbitration is preempted unless the specific arbitration clause can be shown to be unconscionable. The
Court, for example, struck down as preempted by the FAA a Montana statute that required notice of an arbitration clause to be given
on the front page of any contract.84 In addition, although the FAA
was never meant to apply to consumers and was not supposed to apply except when parties consented knowingly and voluntarily, the
Court has upheld application of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts.85 Also—despite Julius Cohen’s admonition that arbitration
should not apply to anything other than the heavily factual disputes
between merchants in their relations with each other and that arbitration should not be used to resolve complicated legal issues—the
Court has asserted that the arbitration process can protect rights
created under federal statutes, such as securities laws, antitrust
81. Statement of Julius Henry Cohen, Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 13 (“Mr.
Chairman, the question was asked: Who opposes this bill? There is no open opposition anywhere.”). Earlier opposition by seamen and railroad employees had been diffused when a
provision was added excluding them from coverage of the Act. See infra notes 321-22 and
accompanying text. In 1925, immediately after the bill’s passage, the ABA Committee on
Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law noted in an article published in the ABA Journal,
“not a single dissenting vote was registered in either House or Senate.” The United States
Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153 (1925) [hereinafter ABA, United
States Arbitration Law].
82. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
83. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
84. Id. at 683-86, 688.
85. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
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laws, and antidiscrimination statutes.86 Moreover, even workers who
were specifically excluded by the language of the FAA have, through
the interpretative processes of the Court, been found to be covered, so
that employers may compel their employees to agree to arbitrate any
disputes if they want to be hired.87 Additionally, individuals have
been held to agreements they have not signed and not even read,
even though enforcement means they have waived a constitutional
right to a jury trial without knowledge or consent.88 Finally, the
Court has suggested that waiver of a class action arbitration in an
adhesion contract is probably enforceable if that is what was intended by the parties.89
The Court has, step by step, built a house of cards that has almost
no resemblance to the structure envisioned by the original statute.
Each card put in place by the Court builds on the prior flimsy courtcreated structure. The edifice we have today incorporates policies
and practices that were never considered or developed by our legislative branch and in fact goes far beyond and even against what the
1925 Congress enacted. The consistent effect of the Court’s interpretation, as will be developed below, is to diminish individual rights, to
significantly reduce access to the courts and the right to a jury trial,
and to favor strong economic interests at the expense of the weaker
party to an extent not seen since the Lochner Court of the early 1900s.90
This Article will document how a simple procedural statute attained such an expansive reach without any further legislative enactments and will discuss the implications of this form of judicial
lawmaking. The next Parts of this Article will consider the landmark
cases in which the Court’s interpretation of the FAA resulted in an
entirely different statute from the one enacted in 1925.

86. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 624-30
(1985); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987); Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-84 (1989); Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20,
24-35 (1991).
87. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109, 119-24 (2001).
88. See Sternlight, supra note 6, at 729-30.
89. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 450-54 (2003).
90. In Lochner v. New York, the court struck down protective state legislation providing that no laborer could be required or permitted to work in a bakery more than sixty
hours in a week or ten hours in a day, holding this was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, but an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with
the right and liberty of the individual to contract in relation to his labor and as such was in
conflict with and void under the Federal Constitution. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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III. PRIMA PAINT AND THE POST-ERIE DILEMMA
A. The Impact of Erie v. Tompkins91
There are several stages in the transformation of the original FAA
into the expansive statute it is today. A critical turning point was in
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,92 where
the Court had to decide, post-Erie, whether a federal court could apply the FAA in a diversity case. Cases leading up to Prima Paint
show a development moving logically but not inevitably to the result
in that decision.
The 1938 Erie decision declared that there was no general federal
common law, thus requiring federal courts in diversity cases to enforce the common law as determined by the state in which they were
located.93 After Erie, in a diversity case, although courts continued to
apply federal procedural law, they were required to apply state substantive law.94 That decision overruled Swift v. Tyson,95 under which,
for almost a century, a federal court having jurisdiction of a case because of diversity of citizenship did not have to apply the unwritten
law—that is, the common law—of the state in which it sat. Rather,
when the common or general law applied, a federal court could use
its own independent judgment as to what the law was or should be.96
Under Swift v. Tyson, nonstatutory law had been considered a unitary “transcendental body of law outside of any particular State”
and a “ ‘brooding omnipresence’ of Reason,” and “federal courts
deemed themselves free to ascertain what Reason, and therefore
Law, [was required].”97
Under Erie, the FAA, which was considered a procedural statute,
would still be applicable in a diversity case. In Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York v. York, however, the Court clarified Erie by saying that it
is not the application of the labels “substantive” or “procedural” that
determines whether state or federal law should be applied.98 Instead,
if the application of federal law would produce a different outcome
from the application of state law, then the federal court must apply
state law.99

91. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
92. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
93. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
94. Id.
95. 41 U.S. 1, 12 (1842).
96. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.
97. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1945) (quoting Black &
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518,
533 (1928)).
98. Id. at 109.
99. Id.
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Thus, the Supreme Court came to be faced with the question
whether a federal court decision to require arbitration was outcomedeterminative. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,100 a
wrongful discharge case that was removed to federal court in Vermont on diversity grounds, the issue was whether the FAA applied,
therefore requiring enforcement of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.101 Vermont law appeared to permit parties to revoke an arbitration agreement at any point prior to the award.102 Application of
the FAA would permit a court to stay judicial proceedings so the arbitration could go forward. The question whether the FAA or Vermont law governed in this diversity case appeared to be squarely before the Court. However, the Court initially dodged the issue by determining that the contract at issue—an employment contract—was
not covered by section 2 of the FAA because it was not “a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”103 The Court therefore
denied the stay of judicial proceedings provided for in section 3 of the
Act104 because section 3 proceedings were only available for contracts
which fit under section 2. Thus, since the FAA was inapplicable, Vermont law applied, making the arbitration agreement unenforceable.105
The Court could have stopped there, but it did not. It went on to
discuss whether “apart from the Federal Act, a provision of a contract providing for arbitration is enforceable in a diversity case.”106
This is a curious statement, since apart from the Federal Act, federal
courts had not been willing to enforce arbitration agreements. Apparently, however, the Court was nonetheless considering whether,
absent applicability of the FAA, a judge-made federal procedural rule
could require arbitration in a diversity case despite a contrary state
rule.107 In considering whether a decision to require arbitration was
outcome-determinative, the Court emphasized the differences between arbitration and litigation, concluding that “[t]he change from a
court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in
ultimate result.”108 It therefore concluded that such a judge-made

100. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
101. Id. at 199.
102. Id. at 204.
103. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
104. Id. § 3.
105. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202.
106. Id.
107. For a fuller discussion of this point, see Schwartz, supra note 70, at 33.
108. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203.
The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an important part of the
parcel of rights behind a cause of action. . . . Arbitration carries no right to trial
by jury that is guaranteed both by the Seventh Amendment and by . . . the
Vermont Constitution. Arbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give their reasons for their results; the record of
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federal rule would be outcome-determinative, requiring that a conflicting state law on arbitration would have to be applied. Thus, a
federal court could not impose arbitration in a diversity case where a
state rule conflicted with a judge-made federal rule. However, because this finding was not necessary to the holding of the case, it was
dicta and did not establish that the FAA could not apply in diversity
cases. Nonetheless, Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence, opined
that because differences in arbitration and litigation can affect the
outcome of a case, the FAA was not applicable to diversity cases.109
A main purpose of the FAA, of course, was to require enforcement
of arbitration agreements in diversity cases.110 That purpose, and
therefore the FAA itself, would be undermined if parties from states
like New York, which required arbitration agreements to be enforced,
could not enforce such agreements in federal court against parties
from states like Vermont, which permitted revocation. Although the
Court in Bernhardt side-stepped the issue by finding the contract in
question not covered by the FAA, it was only a matter of time before
the question of FAA applicability in a diversity case involving a contract in interstate commerce would arise. Eleven years later, the
Court faced that question head-on in Prima Paint.
B. Prima Paint
Prima Paint involved the interstate sale of a business and an accompanying consulting contract.111 The main thrust of the opinion
was whether a court or an arbitrator would determine Prima Paint’s
claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract.112 The Court decided
that under the FAA, if the fraud at issue was alleged to be in the
formation of the contract, as opposed to being in the formation of the
arbitration agreement, an arbitrator would determine the issue.113 A
contrary result would obtain under New York law, which apparently
required that a court determine the issue of fraudulent inducement,
regardless of whether the fraud was in the contract itself or in the
arbitration agreement.114 In other words, if the FAA applied, litigation would be stayed under section 3, and the arbitrator would determine the inducement issue. If New York law applied, the court
their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial review
of an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial . . . .

Id.
109. Id. at 208 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
110. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 418 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]o hold the Act inapplicable in diversity cases would be severely
to limit its impact.”).
111. Id. at 397 (majority opinion).
112. Id. at 396-97.
113. Id. at 403-04.
114. Id. at 410-11 (Black, J., dissenting).
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would make this determination. Thus, the question was squarely put
whether, in light of Bernhardt’s declaration that a decision to arbitrate was outcome-determinative, the federal court could apply the
FAA in a diversity case or whether it must defer to state law.
Prima Paint presented a real dilemma. If the Court applied Bernhardt’s “outcome-determinative” test and followed Frankfurter’s concurring opinion that the FAA should not apply in diversity cases because it was “substantive” under the Erie test, the result would
emasculate the FAA and thwart the intent of the 1925 Congress.115
The easiest solution might have been suggested by Hanna v.
Plumer,116 decided two years earlier. In Hanna, the Court determined
that a federal rule on service of process would apply in federal court
rather than a conflicting state rule, regardless of whether application
of the federal rule would affect the outcome.117 In more recent times,
the Court in Stewart v. Ricoh made clear that if there is a valid federal rule enacted under the Rules Enabling Act or a federal statute
on point, that rule or statute applies in a diversity case.118 In other
words, if Congress has spoken on the issue, then the outcomedeterminative test of Guaranty Trust would not come into play. If
Congress has not spoken and a federal judge-made rule conflicts with
state law in a diversity case, then the outcome-determinative test
must be applied.119
The question then is why, after Hanna, did the Court in Prima
Paint not simply say the FAA applies because it is a validly enacted
federal statute on point in this case? The reason appears to be that at
the time of Bernhardt and Prima Paint, the Court was concerned
about the constitutional power of Congress to enact rules that were
applicable to substantive areas of state law, such as contracts, in a
diversity case.120 Language in Erie suggested that the Article III
115. See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1320 (1985) (“By declaring enforcement of arbitration
to be ‘substantive’ in effect, the Bernhardt decision shut off the option of treating the FAA
as a rule of federal procedure without significance in the Erie scheme.”).
116. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
117. Id. at 473-74. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are adopted by the Supreme
Court pursuant to the delegation by Congress under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2072 (2000).
118. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988) (“[A] district court sitting in
diversity must apply a federal statute that controls the issue before the court and that
represents a valid exercise of Congress’ constitutional powers.”); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 267-69 (1989).
119. See Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S 99, 109 (1945); see also Ricoh, 487
U.S. at 279 n.6 (“If no federal statute or Rule [is applicable], the district court then proceeds to evaluate whether application of federal judge-made law would disserve the socalled ‘twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.’ ” (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 468)).
120. Bernhardt emphasized that in enforcing a state-created contract right in a diversity case, the federal court is in essence “only another court of the State.” Bernhardt v. Po-
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power to control federal courts did not give Congress the right to create rules which affected substantive areas of state law.121 It was only
in Ricoh that those concerns were resolved in favor of congressional
power. Thus, as the courts in Bernhardt and its progeny viewed Erie,
for the FAA to apply in a diversity case, the statute must have been
based on Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.
Prior to Prima Paint, the Second Circuit, in Robert Lawrence Co.
v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.,122 had faced the dilemma raised by Bernhardt. On facts similar to those in Prima Paint, the Robert Lawrence
court found the arbitration clause was severable from the rest of contract and held that arbitrators would decide the issue of fraud in the
inducement of that contract.123 The court dealt with the potential
constitutional issue by finding a congressional intent “to create a new
body of federal substantive law affecting the validity and interpretation of arbitration agreements”124 and by asserting that Congress
based the Arbitration Act “in part on its undisputed substantive powers over commerce and maritime matters.”125 The Second Circuit
therefore broadly held that the Arbitration Act created “national law
equally applicable in state or federal courts,”126 which encompassed
“questions of interpretation and construction as well as questions of
validity, revocability and enforceability of arbitration agreements affecting interstate commerce or maritime affairs.”127
Since the two lower courts in Prima Paint expressly relied on the
reasoning of Robert Lawrence in reaching their decisions,128 Prima
Paint at its core was a review of the Robert Lawrence holding. Although the Supreme Court agreed with the result in Robert Lawrence, it did not approve the broad scope of the decision. It stated
that the question was not “whether Congress may fashion federal
substantive rules to govern questions arising in simple diversity
cases” but, rather, “whether Congress may prescribe how federal
lygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956). It further noted that “[t]he federal court
therefore may not substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the State.’ ”
Id. (quoting Guar. Trust, 326 U.S. at 109).
121. The Erie Court stated, “There is no federal general common law. Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state . . . . And no clause
in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.” Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Hirshman, supra note 115, at 1317.
122. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
123. Id. at 410-12.
124. Id. at 406.
125. Id. at 407.
126. Id. The court acknowledged that in other contexts “enforceability of an arbitration
agreement had generally been considered to be procedural only” and that the point about
the law being substantive and applying in state or federal court “has only rarely been noticed.” Id. at 405, 407.
127. Id. at 409.
128. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 315, 318 (2d Cir. 1966);
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 262 F. Supp. 605, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over
which Congress plainly has [the] power to legislate.”129 The question
concerning “whether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are
to conduct themselves”130 suggests the Court viewed application of
the FAA as fundamentally procedural. Nonetheless, the remaining
clause appears to move closer to a substantive interpretation by referring to “subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to
legislate.”131 While the meaning is somewhat oblique, one implication
is that while Congress had the power to legislate over the subject
matter at issue, it had not done so. What Congress specifically had
not done was create federal subject matter jurisdiction when it enacted the FAA.132 That Congress did not create subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts for the FAA suggests that the law
was not intended to provide any substantive rights. Because
Bernhardt announced that enforcement of arbitration entailed
substantive rights, the question became whether these substantive rights were constitutional.
Perhaps, in referring to subject matter over which Congress had
power to legislate (that was unexercised), the Court in Prima Paint
was referencing the Dormant Commerce Clause. This is an analogous area of constitutional jurisprudence where the Court interprets
and applies the Interstate Commerce Clause in the absence of congressional enactments based on that clause. From early in our history,
the federal courts have been active under the Interstate Commerce
Clause to protect the national economy from interference by state
laws burdening commerce.133 Dormant commerce cases have arisen in
situations like the FAA, where Congress had power to enact substantive law but had not done so.134 Thus, although Congress did not
grant federal subject matter jurisdiction over arbitration contracts in
interstate commerce, the Court was perhaps assuming that Con-

129. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. For a party to go to federal court on a claim under the FAA, there must be a separate basis of federal jurisdiction, such as diversity. 9 U.S.C. § 4 makes this clear: “A party
aggrieved by the alleged failure . . . of another to arbitrate under a written agreement . . .
may petition any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have
jurisdiction under Title 28 . . . .” The Court in Southland stated that “the Federal Arbitration Act . . . does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 or otherwise.” Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 n.9 (1984) (quoting Moses
H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)).
133. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (holding that the Commerce Clause is an
independent limit on state power, even where Congress has not acted).
134. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781-82 (1945) (striking down Arizona Train Limits Law for imposing serious burden on interstate commerce even though
there was no federal law regulating permissible length of trains).
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gress’ inherent power to do so provided the Court with the ability to
apply the FAA, even if quasi-substantive, in a diversity case.135
Ultimately, however, the Court in Prima Paint adopted Robert
Lawrence’s basic solution. Federal law could prevail in a diversity
case because “it is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration
statute is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal foundations of ‘control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.’ ”136
Yet, by asserting that the FAA is “based upon and confined to” Congress’ interstate commerce and admiralty powers,137 the Court ignored specific and repeated references in the legislative history to
Congress’ constitutional power to control federal courts as the basis
for the FAA,138 thereby misconstruing the legislative history of the
FAA quite significantly.139
Julius Cohen’s brief, which was incorporated in the record of the
Joint Hearings of House and Senate Subcommittees, made two
points very clearly. First, the FAA “relate[s] solely to procedure of the
Federal courts.”140 Second, Congress’ power to adopt the statute
“rests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts.”141 This power,
according to Cohen, comes from Article III, Sections 1 and 2, giving
Congress the power to establish inferior courts, and from the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8.142 In his congressional
testimony, Cohen put it more simply: “The theory on which you [provide for federal court enforcement of arbitration agreements] is that
you have the right to tell the Federal courts how to proceed.”143
Moreover, the Senate and House Committee Reports do not support a finding that the commerce and admiralty powers were the exclusive bases of power to enact the FAA, although cited by the Court
135. Seventeen years later, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, Chief Justice Burger referred specifically to Gibbons v. Ogden, noting that Congress’ plenary authority under the
Commerce Clause provided the power for Prima Paint to have “clearly implied that the
substantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts.” Southland,
465 U.S. at 11-12.
136. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924); SENATE
REPORT, supra note 20, at 3).
137. See id.
138. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
139. In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that perhaps the 1925 Congress did not see
its jurisdiction as completely confined to its control of interstate commerce and admiralty
because before the Erie decision in 1938, Congress may have believed it had power to create rules governing questions of “general law,” that is, nonstatutory law or common law in
diversity cases. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405 n.13.
140. Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 37.
141. Id. Cohen also asserted that in enacting the FAA, “Congress rests solely upon its
power to prescribe the jurisdiction and duties of the Federal courts.” Id. at 38 (emphasis
added).
142. Id. at 37.
143. Id. at 17.
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for that proposition.144 The Senate Report does not state what the basis is, and the House Report refers to federal control over interstate
commerce and admiralty as a fall-back, after determining that arbitration enforcement is properly a subject of federal control because it
is a matter of procedure to be determined in federal court and not
one of substantive law.145
The Court did not go so far as to say, like the Robert Lawrence
court, that the FAA represented national law equally applicable in
state or federal courts or that it encompassed questions of interpretation, construction, validity, and revocability as well as enforceability
of arbitration. Rather, the Court in Prima Paint asserted that the
FAA text, in section 4, provided an explicit answer to the question of
severability.146 By framing its decision in terms of an explicit answer
found in the text, the Court appeared to be trying to avoid the full
breadth of the Robert Lawrence approach.
In Prima Paint, the Court reached a pragmatic result but used an
unfortunate method to get there. From one perspective, the decision
may appear to be a good example of dynamic statutory interpretation. That view says a judge may legitimately interpret a statute in a
way that goes beyond—or even against—the original purpose or intent if justified by changes in current circumstances or mores.147 As
Professor William Eskridge has noted, from the time of Blackstone
there has been recognition that judges have the power to adapt statutes to changing circumstances, to consider the reason and the spirit
of the statute.148 Certainly the Prima Paint Court appears to have
adapted the FAA to a change in circumstances—the sea change
brought about by Erie and Guaranty Trust—and interpreted the
statute in a way that preserved the intent of the enacting Congress
to apply the statute in federal court in diversity cases.
There are two problems, however, with the methodology used by
the Court to reach this result: first, it wrongly characterized legislative history, and second, it did not specifically limit its decision. In
incorrectly claiming in 1967 that the underlying power Congress relied
upon in 1925 was exclusively the Commerce Clause, the Court supplied
a basis for arguing that Congress intended to create broad substantive

144. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924); SENATE
REPORT, supra note 20, at 3).
145. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
146. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04. In his dissent, however, Justice Black pointed
out that “[t]he Court thus holds that the Arbitration Act, designed to provide merely a procedural remedy . . . authorizes federal courts to fashion a federal rule to make arbitration
clauses ‘separable’ and valid.” Id. at 411 (Black, J., dissenting).
147. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 10-11 (1994).
148. Id. at 116 (citing 1 Blackstone, Commentaries at 61).
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rights in enacting the FAA, which would preempt state substantive
rights. This is, of course, entirely contrary to the legislative history.149
The Court at the very least should have been much more specific
about the limitations inherent in the rationale for its decision rather
than leaving it open to be expansively misconstrued in subsequent
cases. For example, it could have made clear in the majority decision
what Justice Black stated in dissent: Congress never intended the
FAA to apply to states.150 It could also have more specifically limited
the extent to which it viewed the statute as providing substantive
rights. Instead, by its misuse of legislative history and its failure to
limit the decision to reflect the limited scope of the FAA, the Prima
Paint Court unleashed the statute from its moorings and sent it on a
journey from which it has never returned.
IV. PRIMA PAINT’S EXPANSIVE PROGENY: MOSES H. CONE AND
SOUTHLAND
Although Prima Paint had avoided a specific finding that the FAA
was a substantive statute that could be applied in state court,151 sixteen years later, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp.,152 the Court cavalierly stated in dicta, without
citing to support or authority, that the FAA created a body of federal
substantive law of arbitrability and that the FAA governed in either
state or federal court.153
In Moses H. Cone, the hospital had sued a construction company
in state court. The construction company petitioned in federal court
for an order compelling arbitration under section 4 of the FAA. The
federal district court stayed the federal court suit pending resolution
of the state court suit, but the federal court of appeals, en banc, reversed the stay order and remanded to the district court for an entry

149. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
150. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 424 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The Court here does not hold
today . . . that the body of federal substantive law created by federal judges under the Arbitration Act is required to be applied by state courts. A holding to that effect—which the
Court seems to leave up in the air— would flout the intention of the framers of the Act.”).
151. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 24 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Prima Paint decision ‘carefully avoided any explicit endorsement of the view that
the Arbitration Act embodied substantive policies that were to be applied to all contracts
within its scope, whether sued on in state or federal courts.’ ” (citing PAUL M. BATOR ET
AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 731-32 (2d ed.
1973))).
152. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
153. Id. at 24 (“Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs [arbitrarily] in
either state or federal court. . . . Section 2 is a Congressional declaration of a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of
the Act.”).
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of an order compelling arbitration.154 The main focus of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision was on the question of abstention: should the
federal suit be stayed out of deference to the parallel litigation in
state court?155 In answering that question in the negative, the Court
found that the district court’s stay of the federal suit had thwarted
Congress’ clear intent “to move the parties . . . into arbitration as
quickly and easily as possible. . . . The stay thus frustrated the statutory policy of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration
agreements.”156 Although this sufficed to decide the case, the Court went
on inexplicably to declare that section 2 of the FAA not only created substantive law but that it applied in either state or federal court.157
Moreover, the Court also emphasized, without citing any authority, that there is a strong federal policy favoring arbitration.158 In
fact, however, nothing in the legislative history suggests a strong
federal policy favoring arbitration. The 1925 Congress never indicated in the slightest way that arbitration was to be favored over judicial resolution of disputes. It simply made arbitration of commercial and maritime agreements enforceable in federal court because,
until 1925, such agreements had essentially been revocable at will by
the parties.159 At no point did anyone argue that arbitration was
overall a superior method of resolving disputes. Rather, Congress
was persuaded that where merchants were concerned, arbitration
provided a less expensive option that should be made available to
those who voluntarily agreed to this alternative. The Act, therefore,
would provide enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. However,
there appears to be no basis for Justice Brennan to state that
“[s]ection 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”160 and that “[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration . . . .”161
The so-called policy favoring arbitration appears to be one created
by the judiciary out of whole cloth. A possible explanation for its
creation, however, is that the Court may have indiscriminately superimposed on the FAA the national labor policy favoring collective
bargaining agreements. Indeed, just a few years after the Court
made the above statements in Moses H. Cone, the Court in Mitsubi-

154. Id. at 4.
155. Id. at 14 (organizing its “analysis by examining the abstention doctrine in its various forms”).
156. Id. at 22-23.
157. Id. at 24.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
160. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 24-25.
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shi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.162 cited not only
Moses H. Cone for the proposition that “any doubts . . . should be resolved in favor of arbitration”163 but also United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co.,164 a labor arbitration case, perhaps in
order to shore up the lack of authority for the statement in Moses H.
Cone. In the Steelworker case, the Court, interpreting section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act, stated,
[T]he judicial inquiry under § 301 must be strictly confined to the
question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the
grievance . . . . An order to arbitrate the particular grievance
should not be denied unless . . . the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.165

So the policy announced as a federal policy with regard to the
FAA was instead a policy pertaining to the labor law field.166 In that
field, there are strong national policy justifications for favoring arbitration of collective bargaining agreements—to prevent strikes and
worker violence, to preserve labor peace, and to promote industrial
stabilization.167 These policy reasons do not pertain to the FAA,
which simply provides that arbitration of commercial and maritime
disputes can be a workable alternative to litigation.168

162. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
163. Id. at 626 (“The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration . . . .” (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25)).
164. 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
165. Id.
166. See Schwartz, supra note 70, at 41, who argued that not only was there a “nationalist pull of federal labor law on the FAA,” but also that civil rights-oriented judicial nationalism may have caused Justice Brennan to make the sweeping statements set forth in
Moses H. Cone because he and some of his colleagues may have seen the rejection of a federal court’s stay of litigation in deference to a state court “as an opportunity to make good
civil rights law in the coded form of neutral procedural and prudential rules.” Id. at 43.
167. Id. at 43-44 (“[T]he analogy between federal labor policy and the FAA is faulty.
Arbitration pursuant to collective bargaining agreements is a part of a substantive national
labor policy. It is a quid pro quo for a union’s giving up the right to strike, and therefore a
stabilizing and therapeutic influence that promotes industrial stabilization and industrial
peace nationwide. Arbitration pursuant to the FAA is simply an alternative to litigation.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Some courts have applied the FAA to labor arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 1953)
(“Thus Congress made the Fair Labor Standards Act applicable not only to employees ‘engaged in commerce’ but also to those engaged ‘in the production of goods for commerce.’ ”).
However, this runs counter to legislative history and to Supreme Court decisions that did
not apply the FAA to labor contracts. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Am.,
353 U.S. 448 (1957), where Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, points out that the majority
implicitly held that the FAA did not apply to labor arbitrations:
I find rejection, though not explicit, of the availability of the Federal Arbitration Act to enforce arbitration clauses in collective-bargaining agreements in
the silent treatment given that Act by the Court’s opinion. If an Act that au-
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Because the Moses H. Cone Court had already announced in dicta
that the FAA governed in state and federal court, the majority of justices in Southland Corp. v. Keating,169 which was decided approximately one year later, probably did not think they were taking a very
big step in holding that the FAA preempted state law. In fact, however, this was a giant leap in the misconstruction of the FAA. Prima
Paint, Moses H. Cone, and Southland started the Court down a path
of creating its own statute, one entirely different from the statute
enacted by Congress.
The question in Southland—whether the California Franchise Investment Law, which did not allow arbitration of claims arising under that law, was preempted by the FAA—did not appear to be a difficult decision for the majority. One factor that made the decision
easier than it should have been was that the appellees in Southland
had assumed, based on the Moses H. Cone dicta, that the FAA applied to the states. Because the appellees conceded this point in their
brief, the issue was not vigorously debated.170 The Court asserted
that the decision in Prima Paint finding “the Arbitration Act was an
exercise of the Commerce Clause power clearly implied that the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal
courts.”171 It then noted that Moses H. Cone had expressly stated
“what was implicit in Prima Paint, that is, the substantive law the
Act created was applicable in state and federal courts.”172
Several justices and almost all of the commentators who have
written about Southland agree that this case was wrongly decided
and inconsistent with congressional intent.173 Yet there were six justices in the majority, with Justice Stevens concurring in part and
dissenting in part, and only Justices O’Connor and Rehnquist taking
thorizes the federal courts to enforce arbitration provisions in contracts generally, but specifically denies authority to decree that remedy for “contracts of
employment,” were available, the Court would hardly spin such power out of
the empty darkness of § 301. I would make this rejection explicit, recognizing
that when Congress passed legislation to enable arbitration agreements to be
enforced by the federal courts, it saw fit to exclude this remedy with respect to
labor contracts.
Id. at 466.
169. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
170. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1203 (1982); Brief of Appellees at
51 n.30, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (No. 82-500) [hereinafter Brief of
Appellees]; see also Brief for Attorney General of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (No. 931001) [hereinafter Brief for Attorney General].
171. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 70, at 6; see also infra note 193 and accompanying
text. One commentator who has attempted to support the decision in Southland is Professor Christopher Drahozal, in In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002). See infra note 202.
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full issue with the Court’s decision. To reach its decision, the Court
had to virtually ignore the legislative history that it nonetheless
claimed to rely upon. Although stating that the legislative history is
“not without ambiguities,”174 the Court found that it supported an intent by Congress for the FAA to bind state courts as well as federal
courts.175 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger asserted that
the FAA was based on Congress’ authority under the Commerce
Clause to enact substantive rules, that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to make the FAA applicable in state as
well as federal courts, and that it impliedly did so when it enacted
the FAA.176 Chief Justice Burger also suggested that a broader purpose of making the FAA apply in state courts could be inferred from
the fact that the contracts referred to are those involving interstate
commerce. According to the Chief Justice, “if Congress . . . was creating
what it thought to be a procedural rule applicable only in federal courts,
it would not so limit the Act to transactions involving commerce.”177
These points represent at best pure speculation, which a fair reading of the legislative history quickly undercuts. As Professor
Schwartz has pointed out, language in the bill concerning contracts
involving commerce was amended at the request of Senator Walsh,
who wanted to narrow the effect of the Act, not expand it.178 Prior to
amendment in 1924,179 the bill which became the FAA provided coverage of three categories: “any contract or maritime transaction or
transaction involving commerce.”180 The application of the FAA to
“any contract” would have included contracts not in interstate commerce.181 At the time, contracts not considered in interstate commerce included most employment contracts and insurance contracts.182 Senator Walsh’s amendment limited contracts covered by
the Act to any “contract evidencing a . . . transaction involving commerce.”183 His clear intent was to prevent the application of the FAA
to contracts such as those of insurance and employment, which he
considered adhesion contracts.184 Thus, by limiting the scope of the
174. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12.
175. Id. at 12-15 (“To confine the scope of the Act to arbitrations sought to be enforced
in federal courts would frustrate what we believe Congress intended to be a broad enactment appropriate in scope to meet the large problems Congress was addressing.”) Id. at 14.
176. See id. at 11-12.
177. Id. at 14.
178. See Schwartz, supra note 70, at 21-22.
179. SENATE REPORT, supra note 20.
180. H.R. 646, 65 Cong. Rec. 11,081 (1924).
181. At the time, the FAA could only apply to “any contract” if it were a procedural
statute. See Schwartz, supra note 70, at 21.
182. See id. at 22 n.107.
183. See id. at 21 n.102.
184. 1923 Hearings, supra note 40, at 9 (statement of Senator Walsh) (“The trouble
about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are entered into are really
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FAA to contracts which were actually considered in interstate commerce, Congress was reducing the reach of the bill, not expanding it
to apply in state courts.
The speculation that Congress had a broader purpose than just
creating a remedy in federal courts is repeatedly shown to be unwarranted in the numerous representations that the statute would not
apply to the states,185 that it was only a procedural statute,186 and
that there were efforts afoot through the ABA to promote a Uniform
Arbitration Act for the states that would deal with arbitrations in
state court.187 There is, however, language in Cohen’s brief, which
was incorporated in the record of the Joint Hearings, that supports
the commerce and admiralty powers as alternative (but not exclusive) bases of Congress’ power. Entitled “Legal Justification,” the section begins by explaining that Congress’ power to enact the FAA
arises from the constitutional power Congress has to establish and
control inferior courts.188 Cohen then made three additional “legal

not voluntarily [sic] things at all. Take an insurance policy . . . . You can take that or you
can leave it. . . . It is the same with a good many contracts of employment.”).
185. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 1-2 (“Before [arbitration agreements]
could be enforced in the Federal courts . . . this law is essential. . . . The bill declares simply
such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal
courts for their enforcement.”) (emphasis added); see also Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at
40 (statement of Julius Cohen) (“There is no disposition . . . by means of the Federal bludgeon to force an individual State into an unwilling submission to arbitration enforcement.
The statute can not have that effect.”); see also id. at 28 (Alexander Rose’s statement that
the federal law would inspire states to adopt their own arbitration laws) (“[T]he enactment
of this law, extending its effect all over the United States, will have an effect upon the
cause of that much-desired thing—uniform legislation . . . I have no doubt all of the States
would pattern after it.”).
186. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 1 (“Whether an agreement for arbitration
shall be enforced or not is a question of procedure . . . .”); see also supra text accompanying
note 59 (Congressman Graham’s statement on the floor of the House that the FAA “does
not involve any new principle of law except to provide a simple method . . . in order to give
enforcement . . . . It creates no new legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy to
enforce an agreement . . . .”); see also ABA, United States Arbitration Law, supra note 81,
at 154 (explaining the Act that the ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial
Law had been involved in drafting: “The statute establishes a procedure in the Federal
courts for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. It rests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts.”).
187. In the 1920s, the ABA was working on drafts of both a federal arbitration act and
a Uniform State Arbitration Act, both patterned on the New York Act. See MACNEIL, supra
note 17, at 41-56; see also 1923 Hearings, supra note 40, at 2 (where Charles Bernheimer
refers to an ABA report on the parallel tracks of federal and state legislation (“[T]he adoption of . . . the Federal statute and the uniform State statute will put the United States in
the forefront in this procedural reform.”) (alteration in original)).
188. Cohen made clear that because of this power, the commerce and admiralty powers
are not needed by Congress to enact the statute. Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 37:
It has been suggested that the proposed law depends for its validity upon the
exercise of the interstate-commerce and admiralty powers of Congress. This is
not the fact.

128

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:99

justification” points: (1) the statute would not infringe in any way
upon the substantive rights of each State;189 (2) a statute which declares arbitration agreements valid is nonetheless not a substantive
law;190 and (3) arbitration agreements have always been valid, but
courts simply refused to specifically enforce them, although a damages remedy was available for breach.191
Having provided the legal justification for the FAA, Cohen, in the
last four paragraphs of this section, raised the issue of the commerce
and admiralty powers. Although recognizing the possibility that
Congress had the power to make arbitration agreements connected
with interstate commerce or admiralty transactions enforceable by
the state courts,192 Cohen concluded that even if Congress did not
have this power, it would not matter for the purposes of the FAA.193
“The primary purpose of the statute is to make enforceable in the
Federal courts such agreements for arbitration, and for this purpose
Congress rests solely upon its power to prescribe the jurisdiction and
duties of the Federal courts.”194
Cohen, knowing the FAA was modeled after the New York arbitration statute and aware of the challenges to the New York statute
on state and federal constitutional grounds,195 no doubt wanted the
FAA to be able to withstand any constitutional challenge. As any
well-trained lawyer would, he proposed a fall-back position—the
Commerce Clause—and pointed out that the power of the Commerce
Clause is broad, even broad enough to cause arbitration clauses to be
recognized in state courts. As Professor MacNeil suggested, this appears to be “lawyerly caution”196 because Cohen had stated and continued to state clearly and repeatedly that the statute did not apply
to the states and was merely a procedural statute to be applied in
federal court.197 Cohen’s suggestion that the Commerce Clause was
broad enough to give Congress power to apply the FAA to the states
The statute . . . establishes a procedure in the Federal courts for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. It rests upon the constitutional provision by
which congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts.

Id.
189. Id. “A Federal statute providing for the enforcement of arbitration agreements
does relate solely to procedure of the Federal courts. It is no infringement upon the right of
each State to decide for itself what contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws.” Id.
190. Id. at 38.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
196. MACNEIL, supra note 17, at 114 n.61.
197. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 37 (where Cohen testified that Congress’ power to make arbitration agreements enforceable “rests solely upon its power to prescribe the jurisdiction and duties of
the Federal courts”).
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does not establish that this was Congress’ intent. Rather, the available evidence points to the conclusion that Congress never considered applying the FAA to the states but simply intended this procedural statute to enable arbitration agreements to be enforced in
federal courts.198
The inadequacy of Chief Justice Burger’s attempt to justify the
application of the FAA to the states in Southland by reference to legislative history has been thoroughly documented elsewhere: in Ian
Macneil’s comprehensive book, American Arbitration Law: Reformation, Nationalization, Internationalization;199 in Justice O’Connor’s
impassioned dissent in Southland;200 in the amicus brief of twenty attorneys general who tried to persuade the Court to overrule Southland in a later case;201 and in many fine scholarly articles.202
198. The House Report states, for example, “Whether an agreement for arbitration
shall be enforced or not is a question of procedure to be determined by the law court in
which the proceeding is brought and not one of substantive law . . . . Before such contracts
could be enforced in the Federal Courts, therefore, this law is essential. The bill declares
that such agreements shall be recognized and enforced by the courts of the United States.”
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 1 (emphasis added).
199. See supra note 17.
200. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25 (1984) (“One rarely finds a legislative
history as unambiguous as the FAA’s. That history establishes conclusively that the 1925
Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived, Congress believed, largely from the federal power to control the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.”) Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
201. Brief for Attorney General, supra note 170.
202. See, e.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 2, at 381 (referring to Southland’s “bogus legislative history”); Schwartz, supra note 70, at 54 (finding that “Southland and its
progeny are the result of bad statutory interpretation and even worse federalism”); cf.
Christopher Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 105 (2002) (arguing that despite
weaknesses in the legislative history arguments made in Southland, “there are ‘strong indications’ that the drafters of the FAA intended it to apply in state court.”). Professor Drahozal’s arguments are carefully constructed, thoughtful, and scholarly, but he may continue to swim upstream on this point without much scholarly company. Although he makes
interesting points, one of the main arguments he puts forth—and cites repeatedly—is, in
my view, unwarranted. He construes and relies heavily for support of his position on one
sentence in Cohen’s brief: “The primary purpose of the statute is to make enforcible [sic] in
the Federal courts such agreements for arbitration . . . .” Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at
38. According to Professor Drahozal, this sentence implies that a secondary purpose is to
make arbitration agreements enforceable in state courts. See Drahozal, supra, at 105, 133,
134, 150, 156, 163-64, 169. I submit that the only way this argument can even plausibly be
made is if one reads only the last four paragraphs in the section of Cohen’s brief entitled
Legal Justification and ignores the rest of the legislative history. At no point in the legislative history does anyone testify or write that the FAA should apply in state courts, and
there are many specific statements that it does not. The drafters did have secondary purposes for the FAA, however, and these are clearly expressed. They are to simplify the process and provide speedy justice, to reduce the congestion of court calendars and legal costs,
and to reduce technicality and formality to a minimum. Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at
27, 34, 35. In my view, there is no difference in Cohen’s statement that the primary purpose of the statute is to enforce arbitration agreements and Bernheimer’s statement that
“[t]he fundamental conception underlying the law is to make arbitration agreements valid,
irrevocable and enforceable.” 1923 Hearings, supra note 40, at 2. As for secondary pur-
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Southland has been strongly criticized as wrongly decided and as
an example of very bad federalism.203 To a great extent, however, the
die was cast in Prima Paint. Prima Paint did not, of course, go the
full distance toward misinterpreting the FAA to apply to states. As
Justice Black noted in his Prima Paint dissent:
The Court here does not hold . . . that the body of federal substantive law created by federal judges under the Arbitration Act is required to be applied by state courts. A holding to that effect—
which the Court seems to leave up in the air—would flout the intention of the framers of the Act.204

However, the step in the wrong direction that the Court took in
Prima Paint was large enough to inspire the Moses H. Cone dicta,
which led the appellees in Southland to assume that the FAA applied
to states and to concede this point in their brief.205 There was thus no
vigorous advocacy on this point, and no amici participated.206 From
Prima Paint to Moses H. Cone to Southland, the descent down the
slippery slope was steep and quick. The unfortunate result of the decision in Prima Paint was that later justices in Moses H. Cone and
Southland did not observe the fine line maintained by the Prima
Paint Court and stepped right over it into a major reconstruction of
the FAA as a substantive statute that applied in state court and preempted state law. Once the Court essentially decided to cut itself free
from the legislative history, it then could create an entirely different
statute. It was not persuaded to rethink its actions even by amicus
briefs of at least twenty attorneys general in two major cases, AlliedBruce 207 and Circuit City,208 pointing out the errors of interpretation
of the statute and the resulting intrusion on state police powers. So
despite the fact that, as Justice O’Connor noted, “[o]ne rarely finds a

poses, or other conceptions underlying the law, the drafters made clear that simplifying
procedures to obtain prompt and just resolution of disputes provided a subsidiary basis for
promulgating the legislation. Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 27, 34, 35. The House Report confirms this understanding: “The bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement. The procedure is very simple . . . reducing technicality, delay, and expense to a minimum and . . . safeguarding the rights of the parties.” HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 2.
203. See Schwartz, supra note 70, at 37.
204. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 424 (1967) (Black,
J., dissenting); see also supra note 151 and accompanying text.
205. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 170, at 25 n.30.
206. See Brief for Attorney General, supra note 170, at 2-3.
207. See id. at 11-12 (“Southland’s extension of the FAA to state courts . . . is demonstrably
incorrect, and is in tension with important principles of judicial restraint and federalism . . . .”).
208. Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4,
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379), 2000 WL 1369472
(“[A]n interpretation of the FAA to apply to contracts of employment will seriously impair
the States’ ability to enact and enforce laws protective of employees by preempting a significant body of state law in an area traditionally within the States’ police power.”).
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legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA’s,”209 the Court repeatedly disregarded the legislative history in interpreting the statute.
But the Court also ignored or misused textualism. In its interpretive decisions, it repeatedly ignored critical textual indications that
the statute was not substantive, but procedural. For example, the
FAA is the only federal “substantive” statute in which there is no
federal subject matter jurisdiction. The text of sections 3 and 4 make
clear that a party cannot get into federal court under the FAA; there
must be another basis of federal jurisdiction.210 The Court breezed
past this problem, ignoring the obvious conclusion that there is no
federal subject matter jurisdiction because Congress in 1925 thought
it was enacting a procedural statute.211
The Court also ignored the textual indications that the statute
was meant to apply only in federal court, as specifically stated in sections 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, and 11. Textualists assert that you should look to
the text of the statute as a whole.212 If the Court had considered the
text of the FAA as a whole, all of the references to the “United States
district court” or “the United States courts” should have made clear
that the statute was meant to apply in federal court, not state court.
The decision in Southland, according to Justice O’Connor, was an
“exercise in judicial revisionism” that was “unfaithful to congressional intent.”213 This in turn contributed to a number of other decisions straying even further from the statute as enacted.
V. THE SUPREME COURT’S NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR THE FAA
Once the Court essentially severed the FAA from its historical
context by declaring it to be a substantive statute applicable in both
state and federal court, it rarely looked back at the legislative history. Moreover, the justices not only ignored the historic context but

209. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor went on to explain that “history establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived,
Congress believed, largely from the federal power to control the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.” Id.
210. Section 3 provides in pertinent part: “If any suit . . . be brought in any of the
courts of the United States . . . the court in which such suit is pending . . . [if satisfied that
the suit is referable to arbitration] shall . . . stay the trial of the action . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 3
(2000). Section 4 provides in pertinent part: “A party aggrieved by the alleged failure . . . of
another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title
28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order [compelling arbitration].” Id. § 4.
211. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 291 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he reason that § 2 does not give rise to federal-question jurisdiction is that
it was enacted as a purely procedural provision.”).
212. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 147, at 42.
213. Southland, 465 U.S. at 36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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also ignored or recast earlier precedent that was consistent with the
intent of the enacting Congress.214 Instead, the Court relied on its
own recently created precedent to entirely rewrite the statute and
create an edifice of its own design.215
A. Preemption of State Law
A major change in the architecture of the statute, and the most
immediate impact of Southland’s holding, was the preemption of
state arbitration law by the FAA.216 The various Court decisions preempting state law on a broad basis caused a seismic shift from the
FAA as a simple procedural statute for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court to a major intrusion upon the police powers of
the states.217 Initially, there was a question of how broadly the Court
would apply such a doctrine. At first, it took a reasonably constrained
view. In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Stanford Board of Trustees
of the Leland Stanford Junior University,218 the Court did not find
that the FAA preempted a California procedural statute, even
though that meant that the arbitration proceeding would be stayed
pending litigation.219 The Court acknowledged in Volt that “[t]he FAA
contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.”220 The
Court’s reference to congressional intent is an understatement. Not
only was there no congressional intent “to occupy the entire field of
arbitration,”221 but the statute’s legislative history negated any intent
at all to preempt state law. That history made clear that the statute
was never intended to preempt state arbitration law because it was a
procedural statute222 intended to apply only in federal court.223

214. See infra notes 239-43, 300-02 and accompanying text.
215. Justice Stevens noted in Circuit City that the Court itself had “endorsed a policy
that strongly favors . . . arbitration,” then relied upon the strength of that policy preference
to decide cases, so that “the Court is standing on its own shoulders when it points to those
cases as the basis for its . . . construction . . . .” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105, 132 (2001).
216. In Southland, the Court held that the FAA preempted a provision of the California Franchise Investment Law which required franchise disputes to be resolved in a judicial proceeding. 465 U.S. at 2.
217. See Brief for Attorney General, supra note 170, at 22 (“The control over state court
dockets, including the right to a civil jury trial in the state courts . . . is a matter solely of
state law and state concern.”).
218. 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 37-40. At the time, the law of remedies was considered procedural law, and the widely held view was that arbitral law, which provided a
remedy, was a procedural law. See Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 290
(N.Y., 1921) (“Arbitration is a form of procedure whereby differences may be settled. It is
not a definition of the rights and wrongs out of which differences grow.”).
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Nonetheless, the Court in Volt assumed preemption was proper,
based on Southland, and stated that the question was whether applying California law to stay arbitration “would undermine the goals and
policies of the FAA.”224 The Court found that the state law would not do
so and was therefore not preempted by the FAA.225 This initial reluctance to preempt state law was not, however, adhered to in later cases.
Whether or not a federal law preempts state law is largely a matter of congressional intent.226 One would not expect a broad application of the preemption doctrine when a particular statute, such as
the FAA, lacks specific congressional intent to preempt state law.227
Moreover, preemption is particularly inappropriate when a core state
function is involved.228 A state’s decisions about its legal processes
and how disputes are legally resolved within its jurisdiction are
classically a core state function. The Supreme Court has held that
“ ‘[w]here . . . the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted’ includes areas that have ‘been traditionally occupied by the States,’
congressional intent to supersede state laws must be ‘clear and manifest.’ ”229 The 1925 Congress’ intent for the FAA to supersede state
laws not only was not clear and manifest, it was nonexistent.
Moreover, the “core principles of federalism” require that if federal
statutes are ambiguous, they should not be read to displace state
law.230 Rather, the Court should be “ ‘absolutely certain’ that Congress intended such displacement before [giving] preemptive effect to
a federal statute.”231 Since there was no clear and manifest intent in
the FAA and no absolute certainty about congressional intent, one
223. Julius Cohen noted in testimony before the Joint Subcommittee, “Nor can it be
said that the Congress of the United States, directing its own courts . . . , would infringe
upon the provinces or prerogatives of the States. . . . [T]he question of enforcement relates
to the law of remedies and not to substantive law.” Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 39-40.
224. 489 U.S. at 477-78.
225. Id.
226. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“We have often said that the pre-emptive effect of a federal statute is fundamentally a question of congressional intent.”) (citations omitted).
227. In his separate decision in Southland, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Justice Stevens noted:
[W]hile it is an understatement to say that “the legislative history of the . . .
Act . . . reveals little awareness on the part of Congress that state law might be
affected,” it must surely be true that given the lack of a “clear mandate from
Congress as to the extent to which state statutes and decisions are to be superseded, we must be cautious in construing the act lest we excessively encroach
on the powers which Congressional policy, if not the Constitution, would reserve to the states.”
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1984) (citations omitted).
228. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
229. Id. at 78-79 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)), cited in
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 283 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
230. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 292 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
231. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)).
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might expect the Court to tread lightly in the area of FAA preemption of state law. Instead, the Court has come down heavily in favor of
preemption, leaving little room to the states to regulate in this area.
For example, in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,232 a Montana
state law required that a notice that a contract was subject to arbitration must be “typed in underlined capital letters on the first page
of the contract” or the arbitration clause was not enforceable.233 The
Montana legislature had recently changed the law in Montana to
make arbitration clauses enforceable, and the purpose of this notice
requirement was to ensure that citizens knew that an arbitration
clause was contained in the contract because such a clause was no
longer revocable at will.234 The Montana Supreme Court found in
Doctor’s Associates that the parties’ dispute was not arbitrable because the required notice was not provided.235 It also reasoned, based
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Volt, that the state statute was
not preempted by the FAA because the statute’s purpose was to ensure that the agreement to arbitrate was voluntary and knowing;
that purpose did not undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.236
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In holding that the Montana
notice requirement was preempted by the FAA, it gave a very expansive interpretation of section 2 of the FAA. The text in question provides that written arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.”237 The Court’s interpretation of
this savings clause was that “any contract” really means “every contract” or “contracts generally,” rather than “any particular contract.”
As a result, in the Court’s view, the only grounds for revoking an arbitration agreement are grounds that can be applied to contracts
generally, such as fraud or unconscionability.238 Thus, any state statute which attempts specifically to regulate how arbitration is carried
out is likely to be preempted by the FAA.
A more logical reading of the text, which would put arbitration on
the same footing as other contracts, would be that if any particular
contract could be voided for a specific ground, such as not making a
provision conspicuous or violating a consumer protection statute,
then an arbitration agreement should also be revocable on that
ground. The Court’s interpretation, however, that “any contract”
232. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
233. Id. at 683.
234. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 942 (Mont. 1994).
235. Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 684.
236. Id. at 685 (quoting Casarotto, 886 P.2d at 939).
237. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
238. Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 686-87. The Court cited to precedent in Southland,
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1984), and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265 (1995).
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means “contracts generally” has a particularly intrusive effect on
state law applicable to arbitration agreements. If a state adopts any
legislation that treats arbitration separately—if, for example, it tries
to regulate possible abuses of arbitration by legislation focusing specifically on arbitration, as the Montana statute did—the FAA will
preempt that state law. It matters not that the statute reflects a public policy established by the state, as the Montana Supreme Court
found that the notice requirement did.
Although the Court’s decision in Doctor’s Associates was logically
consistent with some of its more recent prior decisions, the interpretation was not warranted by the text and certainly not by legislative
history or by decisions predating Southland. As noted above, the preemption doctrine was announced by the Court beginning with Southland. In Perry v. Thomas239—a post-Southland case cited as authority
in Doctor’s Associates—the Court had difficulty explaining why the
FAA preempted state law in that case because on similar facts in a
1973 case—Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware240—
preemption by the FAA was not even considered. In Perry, the Court
held that the FAA preempted a California statute which provided
that wage claims must be brought in a judicial forum.241 However, in
Ware, decided fourteen years earlier, the Court had held that the
same California statute was not preempted by rules of the New York
Stock Exchange, promulgated under the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934.242 In Ware, the Court briefly mentioned the FAA in a footnote, but never considered whether it might preempt the California
statute. In his dissent to Perry, Justice Stevens explained why the
FAA was not held to preempt the California statute in Ware in 1973:
Even though the Arbitration Act had been on the books for almost
50 years in 1973, apparently neither the Court nor the litigants
even considered the possibility that the Act had pre-empted statecreated rights. It is only in the last few years that the Court has effectively rewritten the statute to give it a pre-emptive scope that
Congress certainly did not intend.243

Doctor’s Associates, like Perry, is thus a continuation of the court’s
newly created architecture for the FAA. In finding preemption in
Doctor’s Associates, the Court stated that one purpose of the FAA
was that arbitration provisions be placed “upon the same footing as
other contracts.”244 An arbitration agreement, however, is not the ex239. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
240. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
241. 482 U.S. at 484.
242. 414 U.S. at 140.
243. 482 U.S. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244. 517 U.S. at 687 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68)).
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act equivalent of “every contract,” and placing arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts for enforcement purposes does not warrant artificially forcing them into a box that fits
“contracts generally.” First, the arbitration agreement is often a provision contained within a contract, so to some extent it is equivalent
to various other clauses of the contract.245 On the other hand, the arbitration clause is severable from the contract and can be treated as
a separate agreement, as indicated in Prima Paint, where the Court
found that fraud in the inducement of the contract was not the same
as fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause.246 So we are
dealing with a concept that is not quite like the contract of which it is
frequently a part and not quite like any other clause in a contract,
since it is treated as severable from that contract.
Second, the arbitration clause is different from many other contracts and other contract clauses because agreeing to arbitrate
means a party has given up a constitutional right to a jury trial. For
this reason, there are times when an arbitration clause should be
treated differently from “contracts generally” in order to ensure that
a party’s constitutional rights are protected.247 If a state adopts legislation to make sure that a party is not unknowingly giving up its
constitutional rights, such legislation should be entitled to deference
from the Supreme Court as within a state’s ability to set and enforce
public policy. Certainly, a concern expressed by legislators in 1925
was that any agreement to arbitrate must be voluntary.248
Third, in holding that the FAA preempted the Montana law requiring a notice provision of an arbitration agreement, the Court
failed to put the arbitration clause on the same footing as other contracts. States have frequently required certain types of provisions in
contracts to be conspicuous. For example, an attempt to exclude the
implied warranty of merchantability must be conspicuous.249 If a
state law cannot require that a provision containing an arbitration
clause be conspicuous, it means the arbitration clause is not on the
same footing as other provisions. In Prima Paint, the Court stated
that “the purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration

245. For example, in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, Justice Breyer compared
an arbitration clause with other clauses in the contract governing price, service, and credit,
stating, “What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its
basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.”
513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
246. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967).
247. See Sternlight, supra note 6, at 732-33.
248. See supra notes 52-58, 178-82 and accompanying text.
249. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2004) (“[T]o exclude . . . the implied warranty of merchantability . . . the language must mention merchantability and . . . must be conspicuous.”).
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agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.”250 Because an arbitration provision cannot be made conspicuous, while other
contract provisions can be, arbitration provisions are thus more enforceable than other provisions and therefore not on the same footing.251
According to Justice Stevens, the savings clause in section 2252
should permit a state to declare an arbitration agreement void as a
matter of public policy.253 In Southland, he noted that “[a] contract
which is deemed void is surely revocable at law or in equity.”254 If a
state has adopted a regulatory statute that prohibits arbitration in
certain circumstances, in Justice Stevens’ view, the savings clause
would permit that agreement to be revocable. He and Justice
O’Connor have both noted that Congress can legislate that a particular issue cannot be subject to arbitration, but the Court has not explained why state legislatures should not be able to do the same.255
According to these two Justices, even though the Court has held that
the FAA applies to the states, there is no basis in the savings clause
for prohibiting states from regulating what they view as abuses of
arbitration or from protecting their citizens from potential abuses.
Unfortunately, a majority of Justices disagree.
The result of the Court’s decisions in Southland, Perry, AlliedBruce, and Doctor’s Associates is a massive preemption of state contract law. Moreover, lower federal courts have sometimes gone beyond the Supreme Court’s holding to preempt state law.256 In Bradley
v. Harris Research,257 for example, the Ninth Circuit found that the
FAA preempted a provision in the California Franchise Relations Act
that provided that a franchise agreement could not require claims to
be brought in a venue outside of California. This state law did not
single out arbitration because it applied to either litigated or arbi250. 388 U.S. at 404 n.12. As one commentator has noted, the FAA should not “serve as
a special national exemption from state contract law that applies to arbitration agreements
but no other contracts.” David S. Schwartz, FAA Preemption: Does it Wipe Out State Contract Law?, 10 A.B.A. DISP. RESOL. MAG. 23, 24 (2004).
251. Margaret L. Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535, 540-41 (2005).
252. Written arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.
253. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
254. Id. at 20.
255. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing
Southland, 465 U.S. at 21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
256. See, e.g., Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 884 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that FAA preempted state law prohibiting franchise claims to be brought outside of
California); OPE Int’l LP v. Chet Morrison Contractors, Inc., 258 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir.
2001) (holding that FAA preempted state law invalidating provisions that required suit or
arbitration proceedings to be brought outside of Louisiana); KKW Enters., Inc. v. Gloria
Jean’s Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42, 43 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that
FAA preempted state law prohibiting franchise claims to be brought outside of Rhode Island).
257. 275 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001).
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trated claims. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[the California provision] applies only to forum selection clauses and only to
franchise agreements; it therefore does not apply to ‘any contract.’ ”258
The court therefore found the provision preempted by the FAA.
This result would presumably not affect franchise agreements with
no arbitration clause, however, since that would mean the parties intended to litigate disputes. The FAA would be inapplicable in litigation, so it could not preempt the same California law in the litigation
context. Thus, California law could override a forum selection clause
outside of California in a situation involving litigation but not in a
situation involving arbitration. It is difficult to see how this places
arbitration contracts on “the same footing” as other contracts.
Bradley indicates how massively state contract law could be overridden in the name of the FAA. If the Bradley view were widely
adopted, virtually any consumer protection legislation or antidiscrimination legislation relating to arbitration could be preempted
by the FAA because it would not apply “to any contract.” Even if
other courts do not follow Bradley, however, the Supreme Court’s
view that arbitration agreements cannot be regulated by the states—
other than by using generally available contract defenses such as
fraud, mistake, or unconscionability—represents a major intrusion
into the police powers of the state and appears contrary to the
Court’s claim of respecting those rights in other contexts.259
B. Arbitrability of Statutory Claims
Another example of the new architecture of the FAA is the Court’s
holding in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.260 that the FAA applies not just to contract issues but to issues
arising out of statutory claims involving U.S. antitrust law.261 This
holding is difficult to support from either the Act’s text or its legislative history. The text of the Act itself, not surprisingly, reads as

258. Id. at 890.
259. In recent times, the Supreme Court has intervened in a number of instances to
prevent the federal government from, in its view, improperly intruding upon state powers.
It has, for example, struck down provisions of the Violence Against Women Act (United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2002)); the Brady Act, concerning state cooperation
in federal gun control (Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)); and the Gun-Free
School Zones Act (United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)). But cf. Gonzales v. Raich,
125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005) (holding federal law prohibiting marijuana manufacture and
possession did not exceed Congress’ Commerce Clause power in its preemption of California law permitting medical use of marijuana).
260. 473 U.S. 614, 615 (1985) (enforcing arbitration clause providing for arbitration in
Japan for Puerto Rican car dealership and requiring arbitration in Japan of U.S. antitrust
claims raised by car dealership).
261. Id. at 637-38.
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though it applies to contract claims, not statutory claims. The pertinent language of section 2 states:
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract . . . or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.262

There is nothing in this language to suggest that it applies to claims
that are based on an independent legal right outside of a contract.
Moreover, the FAA was never described in the legislative history
as applying to any claims other than contract and maritime claims.263
Nor is there evidence that anyone at the time believed the FAA made
statutory claims arbitrable.264 Additionally, until Mitsubishi, every
federal court that considered the question of whether agreements to
arbitrate antitrust issues were enforceable gave a strong and unequivocally negative answer.265
There were significant policy reasons why the courts believed antitrust claims should not be arbitrated. The most basic was that antitrust laws are aimed at protecting not only individual parties but
also the public at large. An arbitrator’s role, in contrast, is simply to
effectuate the intent of individual parties.266 Unlike a federal judge,
the arbitrator “has no institutional obligation to enforce federal legislative policy.”267 An arbitrator might issue an award that resolved the
individual dispute but was detrimental to the larger public interest.268 Moreover, the arbitral process itself is less suited to the resolu-

262. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
263. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that “[n]othing in the
text of the 1925 Act, nor its legislative history, suggests that Congress intended to authorize the arbitration of any statutory claims”).
264. See Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A “Second
Look” at International Commercial Arbitration, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 481 (1999) (“It is by
no means evident . . . that mandatory law claims necessarily are within the scope of a
statutory provision making irrevocable ‘a written provision in any maritime transaction or
a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . .’ The absence of any evidence
contemporaneous with the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act regarding the arbitrability of
mandatory law claims also would seem to undermine the Supreme Court’s conclusion, as
would the abundant evidence contemporary with and subsequent to the FAA’s passage of a
universal assumption regarding the inarbitrability of mandatory law claims.”) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
265. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 655-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing cases from the
First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits).
266. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1981).
267. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 744 (“Because the arbitrator is required to effectuate the
intent of the parties, rather than to enforce the statute, he may issue a ruling that is inimical to the public policies underlying the [statute], thus depriving [a party] of protected
statutory rights.”). As Dean Philip J. McConnaughay has observed:
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tion of complex antitrust disputes. Frequently, much of the information needed to prove that a monopolist is monopolizing is under the
control of the monopolist. In arbitration, discovery is limited, making
it much less likely that a victim of the monopoly will be able to establish his case and protect the rights Congress intended him to have. In
addition, an arbitral decision is virtually unreviewable because the
bases for vacating an award are limited to narrow statutory grounds,
essentially permitting review only for procedural issues or arbitrator
misconduct but not for an error of fact or law.269 Even if a court were
to review the arbitral proceedings, the record of the proceedings
would most likely be inadequate for such review. It is also worth noting that Congress provided that antitrust cases can only be brought
in federal court.270 Therefore, it is not surprising that until Mitsubishi, federal courts were not willing to permit private arbitrators to
assume a jurisdiction that Congress had denied to the courts of the
sovereign states.271
What countervailing reasons and policies did the Court assert in
Mitsubishi for applying the FAA to statutory claims in the absence of
support in the text of the FAA, the legislative history, and every pertinent lower court ruling? The Court essentially gave two reasons,
each with a twist. First, it relied heavily on the assertion of a “liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”272 stating that the
Court had no reason to depart from these policy “guidelines” when
the claims were based on statutory rights rather than contract
rights.273 The “policy,” of course, is a judicially created policy, pulled
from the labor law field and not based on any preference expressed
by Congress for arbitration over litigation.274 Moreover, as noted
above, Congress never expressed any intent for the FAA to enforce
agreements to arbitrate statutory rights.275
[T]he very purpose of most mandatory economic regulatory legislation is to
constrain private commercial activity in ways believed essential to the greater
public good. Thus, a legally incorrect arbitral resolution of a mandatory law
claim is significantly more likely to affect interests beyond those of the disputing parties than is a legally incorrect arbitral resolution of a contractual or
other elective law claim.
McConnaughay, supra note 264, at 495.
269. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
270. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
271. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Judge Posner’s
comment in University Life Insurance Co. v. Unimark Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 850-51 (7th Cir.
1983), that federal antitrust issues are not arbitrable, because “[t]hey are considered to be
at once too difficult to be decided competently by arbitrators—who are not judges, and often
not even lawyers—and too important to be decided otherwise than by competent tribunals”).
272. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
273. Id. at 626.
274. See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
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The twist added by the Court was the assertion that there was
nothing in the FAA that supported a presumption against arbitration
of statutory claims.276 Lack of evidence of an intent not to arbitrate
statutory claims thus became for the Court a reason for the FAA to
apply to statutory claims. This twist continued as the Court made a
similar claim with respect to statutes, such as the antitrust statutes,
where there is no evidence that Congress intended for the statutory
rights to be arbitrated. The Court concluded from this lack of stated
intent that Congress must have intended the opposite—that is, by
not saying anything to the contrary, Congress must have intended
for the rights conveyed by those statutes to be arbitrated.
“We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against
waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.”277 In other words, the court took
the lack of any evidence in the text or legislative history that the
statutory rights are arbitrable and turned this absence of evidence
into a presumption that such rights should be arbitrated because
nothing said they could not be arbitrated.
The second reason the Court gave for finding the antitrust claims
arbitrable was that this was an international dispute.278 In 1974, in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,279 the Court had found that claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were arbitrable,280 despite its
decision twenty years earlier in Wilko v. Swann281 that such claims
were not arbitrable under the Securities Act of 1933.282 The Court in
Scherk had distinguished Wilko primarily on the grounds that Wilko
involved a domestic situation, whereas the transaction at issue in
Scherk was international.283 The Mitsubishi Court observed:
[A]s in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. . . . , we conclude that concerns
of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of
disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic
context.284

276. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625 (“[W]e find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every contract within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory
claims.”).
277. Id. at 628.
278. Id. at 629.
279. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
280. Id. at 513.
281. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
282. Id. at 436-38.
283. 417 U.S. at 515-16.
284. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).
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To buttress its position, the Court pointed to another earlier case,
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,285 where it had enforced a forum selection clause requiring London to be the forum for any litigation between an American company and a German company on the
grounds that if Americans wanted to do international business, they
must abide by clauses they had agreed to in international contracts.286 The decisions in both Bremen and Scherk, according to the
Court, supported a presumption of enforcement that was “reinforced
by the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.”287 The policy had become even stronger, the Court declared—
without citing to any text or legislative history—because the U.S. accession to the New York Convention meant “that federal policy applies with special force in the field of international commerce.”288
In another twist, the Court found M/S Bremen highly relevant
because, as it had noted in Scherk, an arbitration agreement is in essence “a specialized kind of forum-selection clause . . . .”289 To make
clear what it meant, the Court spelled out that:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It
trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom
for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.290

With this twist, the Court proclaimed that arbitration was not outcome-determinative after all, contrary to its earlier decision in Bernhardt. Substantive rights, according to the Court, are just as well
protected in arbitration as in litigation.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court ignored earlier views it had
taken to the contrary, as well as reality. Arbitration does not provide
the same ability to protect substantive rights, and to the extent a
party cannot protect those rights, it forgoes them. And while parties
of equal bargaining power who choose to arbitrate their contract disputes may properly understand and accept the trade-offs between
arbitration and litigation, permitting parties to waive the full statutory protection provided by Congress may impinge upon third party
rights or the rights of the public at large. Furthermore, in international cases, only a minority of nations permit the arbitration of
mandatory law, so the Court’s move in this direction creates uncer285. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
286. See id. at 9. The dissent pointed out that enforcement of the forum-selection clause
would circumvent U.S. public policy because certain exculpatory clauses in the contract would
be valid in England but against public policy in the U.S. Id. at 24 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
287. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 630 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)).
290. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.

2006]

STATUTORY MISCONSTRUCTION

143

tainties not only about whether arbitrators will properly resolve the
claims but also whether other nations will enforce arbitral awards
based on claims arising under U.S. regulatory statutes, such as its
antitrust laws and securities laws.291
Contrary views expressed by the Court in earlier times show a
strong concern about the lack of protection of rights in an arbitration
proceeding. In Wilko v. Swan,292 for example, the Court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement as to claims brought under the 1933
Securities Act because protection of the buyer’s rights would be “lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings.”293 In Bernhardt, the Court had found that “[t]he nature of the tribunal where
suits are tried is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a
cause of action,”294 such that “[t]he change from a court of law to an
arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result.”295 The Court further noted that the elements likely to make a
substantial difference were the lack of a jury trial right, the lack of a
requirement for arbitrators to give reasons for their decision, incomplete records of the proceedings, and very limited opportunity for judicial review of the award.296 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,297
the Court noted that “[a]rbitral procedures, while well suited to the
resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively
inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title
VII,”298 in part because “resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts.”299
These concerns never surfaced again after Mitsubishi, as the
Court continued to erect a larger, more expansive statutory edifice
for the FAA’s coverage. The Court fairly quickly dispensed with an
international requirement for finding a statute arbitrable, claiming
that Wilko and Scherk had turned not on the international context at
all but, rather, on the Court’s judgment that arbitration in the cir291. See McConnaughay, supra note 264, at 480 (stating that “[p]arties to international arbitrations . . . are left guessing about whether nations other than the United
States will recognize and enforce the arbitral resolution of claims arising under U.S.
mandatory law”).
292. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
293. Id. at 435. The Court considered the following language of 15 U.S.C. § 77 (§ 14):
“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of
the Commission shall be void” and interpreted it to mean that a party could not waive judicial consideration of the claim. “As the protective provisions of the Securities Act require
the exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness, it seems to us that
Congress must have intended § 14 to apply to waiver of judicial trial and review.” Id. at 437.
294. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
298. Id. at 56.
299. Id. at 57.
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cumstances of those cases was not an adequate substitute for judicial
resolution.300 Having recast the issue as one of arbitral adequacy, the
Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon found that
such concerns about adequacy “do not hold true today for arbitration procedures subject to the SEC’s oversight authority.”301 Two
years later, the Court officially overruled Wilko, concluding that
“resort[ing] to the arbitration process does not inherently undermine any of the substantive rights afforded to petitioners under
the Securities Act.”302
There are many good reasons why arbitration of statutory rights
is simply wrong. Congress passed laws such as the antitrust laws,
the securities laws, and the discrimination laws to protect parties it
thought needed protection and to benefit the economy and the public
at large. Arbitration does not provide the same level of protection as
the courts because, inter alia, there is less discovery, there is an inadequate record of the proceedings, and the awards are unreviewable
on the merits. Moreover, because an arbitration award is confidential, it does not develop the law or serve as a deterrent to other potential violators. What seems most skewed, however, is that by giving arbitrators jurisdiction to decide claims under regulatory statutes, the Court is no longer simply approving the private adjudication of individual contractual agreements but has delegated to arbitrators what is essentially the judicial power of the State. Such a
delegation, if made at all, should be made by Congress after debate
and discussion, not by the courts.
After Mitsubishi, however, the Court continued to add more new
rooms to its FAA structure, holding other kinds of statutory rights to
be arbitrable, including those under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),303 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),304 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA).305 It is unlikely that many statutes remain today that the
Court would not find arbitrable.306 Moreover, according to the Court,
the FAA puts the burden on the party opposing arbitration to show
that Congress intended the statute not to be arbitrable or that a
party’s waiver of access to the court “inherently conflicts with the

300. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228-29 (1987).
301. Id. at 233. Recent financial scandals among corporations subject to the SEC’s
oversight authority suggest that the Court’s confidence in such oversight authority may
have been naive.
302. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989).
303. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 241-42.
304. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
305. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
306. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (stating that “[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims
may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA”).
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underlying purposes of the other statute.”307 This burden is rarely
met. The Court’s interpretation of the FAA as imposing this burden
is based, as one might expect, not on text and not on legislative history
but on the “federal policy favoring arbitration,”308 which in the Court’s
view requires it to “rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.”309
What we have seen is that at significant points in the Court’s development of the new structure of the FAA, it has repeatedly used its
own judicially created policy as a major justification for the enormous
expansion of the original statute enacted by Congress in 1925. Because it could not point either to text, legislative history, or precedent in deciding, for example, that statutory claims were arbitrable,
the Court relied heavily on its own judicially created policy that
there was “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration” and that
“doubts . . . should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”310
Lower courts as well relied on that policy, and the Supreme Court
then pointed to those lower court decisions as a basis for its own decisions.311 By supporting its decisions with a policy of its own making,
the Court was “standing on its own shoulders.”312 It then used that
policy to shift the burden to parties opposing arbitration of statutory
claims to demonstrate that such claims were not arbitrable. It thus
made the assumption, without any justification in legislative history
or in the text, that unless proven otherwise by statutory history or
purpose, Congress intended all statutory claims to be arbitrable.313
The Court used its own policy “favoring arbitration” to bootstrap an
alleged intent by Congress for statutory claims to be arbitrable,
without any demonstrable evidence that this in fact was Congress’
intent. After Moses H. Cone, Southland, and Mitsubishi, the FAA was
no longer recognizable as the statute enacted by the 1925 Congress.

307. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 483 (citing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27).
308. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
309. Id.
310. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
311. Justice Stevens characterized the attitude of the 1925 Congress toward arbitration as “neutral” but noted that “a number of this Court’s cases decided in the last several
decades have pushed the pendulum far beyond a neutral attitude and endorsed a policy
that strongly favors private arbitration. The strength of that policy preference has been
echoed in the recent Court of Appeals opinions on which the Court relies.” Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 131-32 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 132.
313. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227 (“The burden is on the party opposing arbitration . . . to
show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue. If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for a particular
claim, such an intent ‘will be deducible from [the statute’s] text or legislative history,’ or
from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.”)
(citations omitted).
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C. Arbitrability of Employment Agreements
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,314 the Supreme Court
reached a high water mark of statutory misinterpretation. Despite
clear indications in the legislative history that the FAA would not
cover workers, the Court gave a cramped interpretation of exclusionary language contained in the Act and found that the FAA applied to
most employment agreements. The exclusion, found in section 1 of
the Act, states that the Act shall not apply “to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”315 Rather than finding a
broad exclusion of employment agreements, the Court held that this
language excluded from coverage only seamen, railroad employees,
and other workers in the transportation industry.316 A look at how the
Court reached this conclusion raises concerns about whether the textual approach used in Circuit City amounts to a misuse of the
Court’s authority.317
The historical context of the Act’s passage is important to a proper
understanding of the exclusionary clause. The only opposition to the
Act had come from organized labor, which was concerned that if the
FAA applied to workers, the disparity in bargaining power would
permit employers to coerce potential employees to enter unfair employment agreements, which would then be enforced by the courts
under the FAA.318 The drafters, whose focus was on enforcement of
arbitration agreements between merchants,319 assured organized labor and Congress that “[i]t is not intended that this shall be an act
referring to labor disputes, at all.”320 Herbert Hoover, then Secretary
314. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
315. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
316. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114-15, 119.
317. Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, “[W]hen [the Court’s] refusal to look beyond
the raw statutory text enables it to disregard countervailing considerations that were expressed by Members of the enacting Congress and that remain valid today, the Court misuses its authority.” Id. at 132.
318. Id. at 152 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens quoted the president of the International Seamen’s Union of America, who stated,
“[T]his bill provides for reintroduction of forced or involuntary labor, if the freeman through his necessities shall be induced to sign. Will such contracts be
signed? Esau agreed, because he was hungry. It was the desire to live that
caused slavery to begin and continue. With the growing hunger in modern society, there will be but few that will be able to resist. The personal hunger of the
seaman, and the hunger of the wife and children of the railroad man will
surely tempt them to sign, and so with sundry other workers in “Interstate
and Foreign Commerce.”
Id. at 126 n.5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Proceedings of the Twenty-sixth Annual
Convention of the International Seamen’s Union of America 203-04 (1923)).
319. See supra notes 50, 81 and accompanying text.
320. 1923 Hearings, supra note 40, at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman of the
Committee of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law of the American Bar Association,
which was the committee responsible for drafting the FAA).
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of Commerce, supported the amendment to exclude workers.321 This
amendment, which specifically excluded seamen, railroad workers,
and other workers in interstate or foreign commerce, appeased organized labor. After the Act’s passage in 1925, the American Federation
of Labor explained to its members that it had withdrawn its opposition because the amendment excluded workers:
Protests from the American Federation of Labor and the International Seamen’s Union brought an amendment which provided
that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” This exempted labor
from the provisions of the law, although its sponsors denied there
was any intention to include labor disputes.322

Thus, no one in 1925—not the drafters, the Secretary of Commerce,
organized labor, nor members of Congress—believed that the FAA
applied to employment contracts. Regular workers were understood
to be excluded from coverage because the Act only applied to contracts in interstate commerce, and regular workers were not considered to be engaged in interstate commerce in 1925 unless they actually worked in industries such as shipping or railroads.323 Seamen,
railroad employees, and any other workers whose employment might
conceivably be considered to be in interstate commerce were specifically excluded by the amendment. Therefore, no workers were covered by the FAA.
So how did the Supreme Court conclude that the amendment only
excluded seamen, railroad employees, and other workers in the
transportation industry? First, the Court stated that it had no need
to “assess the legislative history of the exclusion provision” because
the Court “[does] not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory
text that is clear.”324 Rather, it used a “textual” analysis, applying the
maxim ejusdem generis, a canon of construction. Ironically, the Court
has repeatedly asserted that canons of construction are to be used

321. See supra notes 40, 42-50 and accompanying text.
322. Proceedings of the Forty-fifth Annual Convention of the American Federation
of Labor 52 (1925), cited in Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 127 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
323. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“When the Act was passed
(and the commerce power was closely confined) our case law indicated that the only employment relationships subject to the commerce power were those in which workers were
actually engaged in interstate commerce.”) (citations omitted).
324. Id. at 119 (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994)). After
claiming no need to “assess” the legislative history, the Court proceeded to debunk it as
“quite sparse,” as “problematic,” and as representing the motives of a particular group that
lobbied for or against a certain proposal, whose motives should not be attributed to Congress. Id. at 119-20.
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when a statute is not clear325 and that legislative history can overcome the use of canons of construction.326 Here, the Court turned the
methodology upside down, saying that ejusdem generis made the
statute so clear that legislative history did not need to be assessed.327
Ejusdem generis requires that where there are specific terms followed by a general term, the general term is construed to include
only objects similar to the specific terms. For example, if a bill of a
sale for a farm included cows, sheep, and other animals, “other animals” would probably be construed to mean other farm animals but
not the pet puppy of the farmer’s child.328 With respect to the exclusionary language of section 1 of the FAA, the Court thus said the residual clause (that is, “any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce”)329 “should itself be controlled and defined by
reference to the enumerated categories of workers which are recited
just before it” (that is, seamen and railroad employees).330 Therefore,
“other workers” meant “transportation workers.”331
However, the court applied ejusdem generis incorrectly because it
refused to consider the legislative history and the context it provided
for the clause. The common characteristic that the “other workers” in
this clause shared with seamen and railroad employees in 1925 was
that they were all in interstate commerce, as expressly stated in the
text, not that they were specifically transportation workers. If, in the
farm sale, the provision had said “cows, sheep, and other farm animals,” there would be no need to apply ejusdem generis to figure out
that the other animals meant farm animals and not the family pet.
The court’s strained interpretation is like declaring that ejusdem
generis required that in the phrase “cows, sheep, and other farm
animals,” “farm animals” meant only animals who could give milk.
Nothing in the FAA text suggests that “other workers” should be
limited to transportation workers rather than, as the text clearly
states, “any other class of workers engaged in foreign and interstate
commerce.”332 The legislative history—which the Court chose to ignore—made it very clear that the intended meaning of the residual
325. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74-75 (1984) (“[T]he rule of ejusdem
generis . . . is only an instrumentality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when
there is uncertainty.”) (quoting United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91 (1975)).
326. Watt v. W. Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 44 n.5 (Application of ejusdem generis to the
words “coal and other minerals” was inappropriate because “[t]he legal context in which
the SRHA was enacted suggests that Congress specifically listed coal to make clear that
coal was reserved even though existing law treated it differently from other minerals.”).
327. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 138 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
328. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 833, 853 (1964).
329. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
330. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115.
331. Id. at 115, 119.
332. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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clause was that the “other workers” were workers who, like seamen
and railroad workers, were in interstate commerce and therefore
were unlike most workers, who were not considered to be in interstate commerce. Seamen and railroad workers were specifically
named to assuage those groups most actively opposed to the bill.333
The residual clause was included to make sure that any worker who,
like seamen and railroad workers, could be engaged in interstate
commerce and therefore covered by the Act was excluded. The purpose of the amendment was to convince organized labor that all
workers—those who were in interstate commerce as well as those
who were not—were excluded from the reach of the FAA. By refusing
to assess the legislative history, allegedly because the text was so
clear, the Court essentially freed itself to follow its own preferences
and policies as to the structure and application of the FAA, rather
than to interpret the legislation actually enacted.
In his dissent to Circuit City, Justice Souter focused on the majority’s anomalous interpretation of the words “engaged in commerce” of
the residual clause. The majority had stated that even without applying ejusdem generis, it would not interpret “engaged in commerce” to
mean exclusion of all employment contracts because “engaged in
commerce” was a narrower term than “affecting commerce” or “involving commerce.”334 Justice Souter made the point that it does not
make sense to read the coverage language in section 2 (that a written
arbitration agreement will be enforced in a contract evidencing a
transaction “involving commerce”) as expanding with the extended
reach of the Commerce Clause while reading the exemption language
of section 1 (excluding workers “engaged in interstate commerce”) as
“petrified.”335 In 1925, contracts evidencing a transaction involving
commerce did not include ordinary workers’ contracts of employment.336 To the extent that today the coverage language in section 2
broadly reaches workers under a twenty-first-century concept of the
Commerce Clause, the exemption language of section 1 should just as
broadly exclude them. The increasing number of workers who fall
under the expanded coverage of section 2 should fall out of coverage
at the same rate by means of a similarly expanded exemption in sec-

333. The Court asserted that if the residual clause were found to apply to all contracts
in interstate commerce, it would make the specific mention of seamen and railroad workers pointless. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114. It is not pointless, however, “to adopt a clarifying amendment in order to eliminate opposition to a bill.” Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
334. Id. at 114-19 (majority opinion).
335. Id. at 136-37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
336. See supra note 323 and accompanying text; see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.,
350 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1956) (determining that the employment contract at issue was not
covered by section 2 of the FAA because an employment contract did not “evidence a transaction involving commerce within the meaning of § 2”).
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tion 1.337 This would be a coherent reading of the statute that would
retain its purpose. Instead, workers now viewed as covered by section
2 get caught in the Court’s web of statutory misconstruction.
The Court’s view that all workers except railroad workers, seamen, and transportation workers were intended to be covered by the
Act makes little sense. According to the Court’s interpretation in Circuit City, Congress excluded from coverage those contracts most
clearly involving commerce, but it included those contracts viewed as
having a much more uncertain connection to commerce. In other
words, Congress, having declared that the FAA was only going to apply to contracts involving interstate commerce, meant to include all
workers except those who were actually involved in interstate commerce. This interpretation is illogical, if not irrational. The purpose
of the exclusion, made clear from the legislative history, is that the
FAA did not apply to any employment contracts.
Justice Scalia has criticized the use of legislative history to interpret a statute on the grounds that it greatly increases a court’s ability to make a decision “based upon [its] policy preferences, rather
than neutral principles of law.”338 Yet, in Circuit City, the Court’s use
of a textualist approach while refusing to consider the legislative history of the FAA and the historical context—which made it clear that
workers were intended to be excluded from the statute’s coverage—
raises similar questions about whether the Court was making a decision based on neutral principles of law. By disconnecting the text of
the statute from the purpose of the amendment intended to exclude
workers, the Court freed itself to make a decision based on its policy
preference rather than ascertaining the meaning Congress intended
when it adopted the language excluding workers. Relying on text to
the exclusion of purpose can undermine not only the particular legislation but also the democratic objective of the Constitution.339 Scholars have opined that isolating the text from the intent behind the

337. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary’s Failure of Statutory Vision,
1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 259, 263-79.
338. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
35 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1997).
339. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 98-99 (2005) (stating that “near-exclusive reliance upon canons and other
linguistic interpretive aids in close cases can undermine the Constitution’s democratic objective. Legislation in a delegated democracy is meant to embody the people’s will . . . . [A]n
interpretation of a statute that tends to implement the legislator’s will helps to implement
the public’s will and is therefore consistent with the Constitution’s democratic purpose. . . .
[A]n interpretation that undercuts the statute’s objectives tends to undercut that constitutional objective.”).
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text simply means that the law disappears and is replaced by an exercise of power.340
The Circuit City decision occurred at what may have been a high
point in the use of textualism by the Court. In the paragraph following the declaration that the Court did not need to assess legislative
history because the text was so clear, it then proceeded to address
the legislative history, setting out essentially a critical viewpoint not
only toward the legislative history of the FAA, but toward legislative
history generally.341 The Court noted that the legislative record on
the section 1 exemption of workers was “quite sparse.”342 It then asserted that legislative history was problematic when inferences of intent were drawn from committees, and even more so when reference
was made to interests groups, such as the International Seaman’s
Union, whose objections prompted the amendment adding the exemption.343 The Court then stated, “We ought not attribute to Congress an official purpose based on the motives of a particular group
that lobbied for or against a certain proposal—even assuming the
precise intent of the group can be determined, a point doubtful both
as a general rule and in the instant case.”344
But the intent that the Court needed to ascertain was Congress’
intent, made in response to the objections of the Seaman’s Union, to
help explain why a particular amendment was added to the bill. Textualists assert that legislative intent is virtually impossible to ascertain because most members of Congress may not even be aware of a
particular issue, much less why it is resolved a certain way.345 In
more recent times, however, there has been somewhat of a resurgence in the Court’s use of legislative history and a deepening understanding, supported by scholars, of how the legislative process can
contribute to and be understood as the collective intent of Congress.346 Justice Stevens has contributed to this understanding, noting:
Legislators, like other busy people, often depend on the judgment of trusted colleagues when discharging their official responsibilities. If a statute . . . has bipartisan support and has been care340. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Op-Ed., Intentional Neglect, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2005, § A,
at 21; see also Stanley Fish, There is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 649
(2005) (“A text means what its author intends. There is no meaning apart from intention.
There is no textualist position because intention is prior to text; no intention, no text.”).
But cf. Miranda Oshige McGowan, Against Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 711, 732
(2005) (“Deciding a case entails . . . many other types of decisions besides the applicable
law’s meaning . . . .”).
341. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 120-21 (2001).
342. Id. at 119.
343. Id. at 119-20.
344. Id. at 120.
345. See SCALIA, supra note 338, at 32.
346. See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme
Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 206-07.
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fully considered by committees familiar with the subject matter,
Representatives and Senators may appropriately rely on the views
of the committee members in casting their votes. In such circumstances, since most Members are content to endorse the views of
the responsible committees, the intent of those involved in the
drafting process is properly regarded as the intent of the entire
Congress.347

Moreover, scholars such as Professor Charles Tiefer have provided
solid scholarly support from the fields of analytic philosophy of language and political science for using the history of the legislative
process as a valid and reliable concept of collective intent.348
What the interpretive history of the FAA suggests is that a close
examination of both the text of the statute and the legislative history
should be used to give to the statute an application that remains
faithful to the purpose of the legislation and is consistent with the intent of the enacting Congress. While some dynamic statutory interpretation may be warranted, for example, where the reach of the
Commerce Clause is now broader than it was at the time of the enactment, the Court should endeavor to interpret the statute coherently and consistently to maintain the integrity of the statute’s purpose. It should not, as it did in Circuit City, interpret the Commerce
Clause broadly in one section for the purpose of including workers
and narrowly in another section for the purpose of excluding them, so
that one purpose of the statute—excluding employment agreements
from coverage—is completely rewritten by the Court.
D. Further Preemption of State Contract Law
In the recent Supreme Court decision in Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna,349 the question was whether an arbitrator or the
court should decide a claim that a contract was illegal. The Florida
Supreme Court had held that despite the presence of an arbitration
clause in the contract, the court rather than an arbitrator should resolve the question of whether Buckeye Check Cashing was charging
usurious interest rates in violation of various Florida laws.350 Based
on Florida law, the state court held that an arbitration provision could
not be separately enforced when a claim was pending in a Florida
court that the contract itself was illegal and therefore void ab initio.351

347. Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1996)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
348. See Tiefer, supra note 346, at 251-71.
349. 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006).
350. Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla. 2005).
351. Id. at 861.
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The petitioners argued that Prima Paint controlled the decision in
this case.352 Prima Paint held that in a claim of fraudulent inducement of the contract, the arbitration agreement was severable and
enforceable because there was no claim that the fraud was directed
specifically to the arbitration agreement.353 Therefore, the arbitrator
would decide the claim of fraudulent inducement.354 The respondents
argued, however, that Prima Paint had been decided as a federal
court case under section 4 of the FAA, a section which the Courts
have never applied to the states.355 Further, section 2, the only section of the FAA that had been applied to the states, required as a
threshold question that the arbitration provision be included within
a contract.356 If the contract was void ab initio, then it simply did not
exist. Therefore, the FAA could not apply, because the arbitration
agreement then would not meet the threshold requirement of being
contained within a contract.357 Thus the question, according to the respondents, was one of contract law, which is a core state function—
one that should not be preempted by a federal statute that does not
even define what a contract is.358
The Supreme Court, in a 7-1 decision,359 thought otherwise. Justice Scalia asserted that Prima Paint did control, relying on Southland and Prima Paint to the effect that the FAA was substantive
federal law, that an arbitration agreement was severable from the
rest of the contract, that the law applied in state as well as federal
court, and that the difference between void and voidable contracts
was “irrelevant.”360
Although avoiding any direct discussion of the preemption of state
contract law by the federal statute, the Court provided a different
and rather unusual reading of section 2 of the FAA. In response to
the argument that when an agreement is void ab initio under state
law, there is no written provision to which the FAA can apply, Justice Scalia opined that “contract” in section 2 can mean a void contract. According to Justice Scalia, the meaning of “contract” in the final clause, which permits nonenforceability “upon such grounds as

352. See Brief for Petitioner at 13-16, Buckeye, 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006) (No. 04-1264).
353. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
354. See id.
355. Brief for Respondents at 13-17, Buckeye, 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006) (No. 04-1264)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondents]; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16
n.10 (1984) (stating the same).
356. Brief for Respondents, supra note 355, at 20-22.
357. Id. at 27-30.
358. Id. at 30-32.
359. Justice Alito did not participate. Justice Thomas wrote a brief dissent reiterating
his position that the FAA “does not apply to proceedings in state courts.” Buckeye, 126 S.
Ct. at 1211.
360. Id. at 1209-11 (majority opinion).
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exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,”361 “must
include contracts that later prove to be void.”362 Justice Scalia does
not acknowledge the common law concept that a contract that does
not exist because it is void ab initio cannot be revoked.363 A contract
must first exist legally before revocation can occur.
Nonetheless, once Justice Scalia decided that “contract” in the last
phrase of section 2 can mean “void contract,” he declared that the
other three uses of “contract” in section 2 also include the meaning
“void contract,” stating that “we will not read the same word earlier
in the same sentence to have a more narrow meaning.”364 As a result, here is one way that Justice Scalia thinks the provision should
be understood:
A written provision in . . . a [void] contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such [void] contract . . .
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a [void] contract . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any [void] contract.365

Justice Scalia appears to be saying that because the meaning of
“contract” in section 2 includes the meaning of “void contract,” the
federal statute preempts any state contract law which would consider a void contract as having no legal effect. The result in Buckeye
is an even broader preemption of state contract law than in Prima
Paint and Southland and moves us yet further away from the legislation enacted in 1925. Buckeye is another expression of judicial policy
preferences to support businesses that seek to limit consumer access
to the courts and to restrict the ability of states to regulate contract
law within their borders.
VI. CONCLUSION
In creating a statute that goes far beyond the intended scope of
the original statute, the Court has essentially legislated in favor of
its own policy preferences without the benefit of any input from Congress.366 What are those preferences? As derived from the impact of
361. Id. at 1210 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)).
362. Id.
363. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stearns & Culver Lumber Co., 48 So. 19 (1908); Castro v. Sangles, 637 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
364. Buckeye, 126 S. Ct. at 1210.
365. Id. at 1208; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
366. It could be argued, as Justice Kennedy did in Allied-Bruce, that Congress, by not
acting to retract the scope of the FAA, has in essence acquiesced to Southland’s application
of the FAA to the states. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272
(1995). But legislative inaction arguments have been criticized by commentators, who note
that such arguments must be evaluated in the context of political decisionmaking and may
be affected by dysfunctions in the process. For example, Professor Eskridge notes that
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the arbitration law on our legal system, certain conclusions seem obvious. The new FAA has substantially reduced access to the court
system, particularly for consumers, workers, and those with little
economic power.367 Any employer, hospital, bank, telecommunications
company, transportation company, and scores of other businesses can
prevent those with less economic power from ever having access to
court to hold them accountable. This means, of course, no right to a
jury trial, limited discovery, frequently no right to a class action, and,
because an arbitration award is not reviewable on the merits, no supervision by our court system.368
Moreover, regulatory statutes enacted by Congress to protect investors and businesses from monopolists are being privately resolved
without any judicial review on the merits and without any ability to
know if the public interests are being protected as Congress intended.369 The Court has thus brought to fruition the fears of earlier
Justices—prior to the enactment of the FAA— who did not want to
enforce arbitration agreements. As Julius Cohen informed the Joint
Hearings, these Justices had fears that “the stronger would take advantage of the weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect
them.”370 Justice Story had made this same point in 1845, that while
courts have no wish to discourage arbitrations and would enforce
awards when lawfully made, they hesitated “to compel a reluctant
party to submit [to arbitration], and to close against him the doors of
“[o]ne dysfunction is that the interests of the ‘haves’ (business, unions, the state) tend to be
developed at the expense of the ‘have nots’ (consumers, single-parent families, people with
low incomes)” because the “haves” are better able to work the system. Another dysfunction,
according to Professor Eskridge, is inertia: “It is much easier to block congressional action
than it is to obtain such action.” See ESKRIDGE, supra note 147, at 250-51.
367. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 37;
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just? 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,
1632 (2005).
368. Critics of the practice of compelling arbitration point to the lack of actual consent,
the lack of procedural protections, the minimal amount of discovery available, the frequent
presence of prohibitions on class actions or consolidations of claims, and the questionable
neutrality of arbitrators, who may be more inclined to decide in favor of repeat players
such as large companies rather than the individual. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do
the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497,
499 (1991); Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived” and Lost
in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 381 (1996); Schwartz, supra note
367; Richard Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1349-56 (1996); Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of
the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 839 (2002).
369. See McConnaughay, supra note 264, at 495 (“[T]he value of legally correct outcomes often is greater in mandatory law [arbitrations]” because mandatory law claims
“implicate the rights of unrepresented third parties or the public. . . . [A] legally incorrect
arbitral resolution of a mandatory law claim is significantly more likely to affect interests
beyond those of the disputing parties . . . .”).
370. Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 15.
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the common courts of justice, provided by the government to protect
rights and to redress wrongs.”371
Despite concerns expressed by members of the 1925 Congress that
arbitration not be imposed in a “take-it-or-leave-it” context, the Supreme Court since the 1980s has created a statute which permits
businesses to do exactly that. Moreover, in finding that the FAA extensively preempts state law, the Court has substantially intruded
on state police powers in two core areas typically within the province
of the states: (1) contract law, including consumer protection, and (2)
the resolution of legal disputes within the state or between its citizens. As a result, states are not permitted to protect their citizens
from perceived abuses arising from a “take-it-or-leave-it” arbitration
requirement. The FAA preempts, for example, legislation that requires that notice of an arbitration clause be given on the first page
of a contract.372
Other nations have made different choices than our Supreme
Court. In the European Union, for example, most predispute arbitration agreements with consumers are invalid under the E.U. Directive
on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.373 European consumers
generally do not engage in arbitration unless an agreement to arbitrate is reached after the dispute has arisen. The Europeans apparently believe that consumers can only fairly weigh the differences between arbitration and litigation and make an informed choice once a
dispute has actually arisen.374
It is a matter of concern that in the U.S., policy choices concerning
the appropriate use of arbitration have been made judicially, not legislatively. These judicial policy choices appear to reflect the interest
of the courts in reducing the judicial caseload.375 They also appear to
371. Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).
372. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
373. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Annex 1(q), 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29; see also Christopher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and
the United States, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 357, 358-59 (2002) (discussing the higher
level of protection provided to consumers in the European Union, where consumers generally do not arbitrate a dispute unless an agreement to do so is reached after the dispute
arises); Sternlight, supra note 368, at 831, 853-54 (discussing the uniqueness of the U.S.
approach of compelling consumers to arbitrate and suggesting that compelled arbitration
provides a method for corporations to control public policy).
374. See Sternlight, supra note 368, at 846 n.99.
375. In The Hundred Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, Marc Galanter
suggested that the striking decline in the number of trials, particularly in the last thirty
years, has resulted from a “turn against the law,” with recourse to tort reform and ADR as
part of a wider wave of deregulation and privatization. 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1264, 126970 (2005). He also discussed the decline as the “the result of a conjunction of a restricted
supply of judicial resources” with courts’ increasing efforts to “supply signals, markers, and
sufficient background threats to induce resolution (or abandonment) of claims.” Id. at 1264;
see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 753 (1981) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (“This Court ought not be oblivious to desperately needed changes to keep the
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reflect a preference for protecting stronger economic interests at the
expense of the individual worker, consumer, investor, or small business by providing large corporations with a method of limiting enforcement of legislation regulating discrimination in the workplace,
competition practices, financial markets, and consumer rights.
The statutory misconstruction of the FAA should make clear that
there is no one method of statutory interpretation which can cabin
judicial discretion or prevent judicial legislation. Over the last
twenty-five years, the Justices have shown an ability to misuse both
legislative history and textualism to reach their desired result,
rather than to interpret the statute that was enacted. This has been
true of Justices across the board, not simply those considered “liberal” or those considered “conservative.”376 All of the Justices at various points in time lost sight of the purpose and scope of the legislation or deferred to faulty precedent, creating a far different statute
from the one enacted by Congress.377
Although theories of dynamic statutory interpretation favor interpreting statutes to meet the needs of the current era when a clear
change in mores or understanding provides a basis for such an interpretation,378 there is no change of mores or understanding that sup-

federal courts from being inundated with disputes of a kind that can be handled more
swiftly and more cheaply by other methods.”); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (1959) (“[A]ny doubts as to the construction of the Act ought to be
resolved in line with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration . . . to help ease the current
congestion of court calendars.”).
376. The Moses H. Cone decision—in which the Court first announced in dicta that the
FAA governs in both state and federal court and proclaimed that the FAA requires a “liberal reading of arbitration agreements” and “a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration”—was written by Justice Brennan, one of the most liberal justices on the
Court at that time. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23
nn.27 & 24 (1983). The opinion for Doctor’s Associates, which preempted Montana law requiring notice of arbitration, was authored by Justice Ginsburg. 517 U.S. 681. Two of the
staunchest opponents of Southland’s application of the FAA to the states, other than Justice O’Connor, have been Justices Scalia and Thomas. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc.
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 285-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Yet, when the Court expanded the FAA to cover employment contracts in Circuit City,
despite twenty-one state Attorneys General objecting that this was an unlawful encroachment on state police powers, see supra note 208 and accompanying text, Justices Scalia
and Thomas joined with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy in
the majority opinion. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
377. Justice O’Connor, for example, who had so passionately opposed Southland and
the Court’s application of the FAA to the states, concurred in the Allied-Bruce decision,
which refused to overrule Southland on stare decisis grounds, noting nonetheless that Southland had “laid a faulty foundation” for subsequent decisions. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284.
378. William Eskridge describes how the Immigration Act of 1952, which provided that
“[a]liens afflicted with pyschopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect” would be denied entry to the U.S., was, in the 1950s and 1960s, interpreted to require exclusion of homosexuals. ESKRIDGE, supra note 147, at 51 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2000)). As society’s views of homosexuals changed, however, so did the interpretation of the statute, so
that by the 1980s the INS was no longer applying the provision to exclude homosexuals.
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ports the extraordinary rewriting of the FAA by the Supreme Court.
Rather, the interpretation of the Court is one which leads back to the
Lochner era, when state protective legislation intended to prevent
exploitation of workers was struck down in the name of “freedom of
contract” while federal protective legislation was found to be beyond
the commerce powers of Congress. Today, there is wide-spread concern that protections of consumers, workers, investors, and beneficiaries of statutory protections have eroded as a result of greatly reduced access to enforcement by the courts.379
The laissez-faire philosophy of the Lochner era, that neither state
nor federal governments could restrict the market through protective
legislation, came under attack in the mid-1930s. Legal realists asserted that the Court was simply making a political choice to favor
employers and corporations over workers and consumers.380 The end
of the Lochner era was signaled by cases such as United States v.
Carolene Products Co.,381 which established that legislation governing commercial transactions should not be found unconstitutional so
long as it rested upon some rational basis.382 In “famous footnote
four,” however, the Court asserted that legislation restricting the
rights of individuals might need to be subjected to a more exacting
judicial review.383
That concern for individual rights has not been apparent in the
Court’s interpretation of the FAA. In disregard of the concern for individual rights expressed in footnote four of Carolene Products, the
Court has used various statutory interpretation techniques to reduce
the protections legislated in the fields of federal antitrust, securities,
and employment law and has intruded upon state police powers to
prevent states from enforcing legislation designed to protect their
citizens against an unfair or unreasonable imposition of arbitration.
FAA interpretation creates a statutory replication of the restriction
of both state and federal protective legislation rejected in 1937.384
The Court’s expansive interpretation of the FAA may appear inconsistent with recent decisions striking down the Gun-Free School
See id. at 50-55. The provision was repealed by the Immigration Act of 1990, Public Law
No. 101-649 § 601. ESKRIDGE, supra note 147, at 51 n.10.
379. See Sternlight, supra note 367, at 1648-58, for a summary of both critics’ and defenders’ views of mandatory arbitration.
380. See Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697
(1931). For the role of the legal realists in undercutting the Lochner philosophy, see
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 176-78, 195-98 (1993).
381. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
382. See id. at 152-53.
383. See id. at 152 n.4.
384. The Lochner era is generally considered to have ended in 1937 with the decision in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (upholding constitutionality of National Labor Relations Act).
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Zones Act (the Lopez case)385 and certain provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act (the Morrison case)386 as beyond the scope of the
Commerce Clause. Unlike the decisions interpreting the FAA, which
have intruded on state police powers, in these decisions the Court
has claimed to be limiting Congress’ power to intrude on state police
powers. A closer look, however, suggests similar judicial policy preferences. In both kinds of cases, the present Court, like the Lochner
Court, is limiting or striking down regulatory statutes which protect
individuals—using the Constitution for some, the FAA for others.
Justice Souter commented in his dissent in Morrison, for example,
that the decision “can only be seen as a step toward recapturing the
prior mistakes [of the Lochner era].”387 Similarly, in the FAA cases
the Court has undermined both federal and state regulatory statutes
by requiring parties to arbitrate statutory rights and by striking
down state statutes intended to protect parties from abuses of arbitration. The Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act has
led full circle back to the political choices made in the Lochner era—
to undercut state and federal protective regulations and to favor employers over employees and corporations over consumers.

385. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
386. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
387. Id. at 643.

